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THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOl...lL
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS

The difficulty in solving the problem of the knowledge of the separated
soul in the Philosophy of St. Thomas arises from st. Thomas' conception of
the nature of the soul and its union with the body.

He maintains, as we sh

see further on, that the soul needs the body, and that it is natural for the
soul to understand by turning to the phantasm which is in a corporeal organ.
This need of the soul to be united to the body proceeds from the very nature
of the soul itself.

For one who held that the union of soul and body is not

required by the nature of the soul there would be no difficulty in explaining how the soul knmvs when separated from the body.

St. Thomas attributes

such an opinion to Plato, interpreting Plato's doctrine on the union of soul
and body thus:
• • • Ponebat enim totam naturam speciei in anima esse,
dicens hominem non esse aliquid compositum ex anima et
corpore, sed an~ corpori advenientem; ut sit comparatio animae ad corpus sicut nautae ad navem, vel secuti
induti ad vestem.
]2! Anima, q.un.a.l.
In such a doctrine the question of the knowledge of the separated soul is

easily solved, for just as the sailor is naturally quite independent of the
ship in so far as his action is concerned, so too vrould the soul be independent of the body in carrying on its proper operation.

Instead of having to

turn to phantasms in order to understand, the soul would be able to under1
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stand intelligible things simply.

St. Thomas points out:

• • .quod ista quaestio difficultatem habet ex hoc quod
anima, quamdiu est corpori conjuncta, non potest aliquid
intelligere non convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut per
experimentum patet. Si autem hoc non est ex natura
animae, sed per accidens hoc convenit ei, ex eo quod
dorpori alligatur, sicut Platonioi posuerunt; de facili
quaestio solvi posset. Nam remote impedimento corporis,
rediret anima ad suam naturam, ut intelligeret intelligibilia simpliciter, non convertendo se ad phantasmata,
sicut est de aliis substantiis separatis.
~.Theol.,I.q.89.a.l.,c.

Such an opinion cannot stand however, for it at least implies that the union
of soul and body is not for the good of the soul, as it would seem that the
soul understands better out of the body than in the body.

st. Thomas holds

that the union of soul and body is natural to the soul, and that whatever is
natural to a thing is good for that thing.
Videtur etiam sequi ex hac opinione quod unio animae
ad corpus non sit naturalis: nam quod est naturale
alicui non impedit ejus propriam operationem. Si
igitur unio corporis impedit intelligent!~ animae,
non erit naturale animae corpori uniri, sed contra
naturam; at ita homo qui oonstituitur ex unione
animae ad corpus, non erit aliquod naturale: quod
videtur absurdum.
E! Anima, q.un.a.l5,c.
In another place St. Thomas quotes from Eccles., vii, 30.

Deus fecit hominem rectum.
He then continues;
Haec autem fuit rectitudo hominis divinitus instituti, ut inferiora superioribus subderetur, et
superiora ab inferioribus non impedirentur • • •
~.Theel., I.q.94.a.l.
Therefore the union of the soul with the body is for the good of the soul.
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Matter that is, exists for the sake of the form, not form for the sake of
matter.

In rejecting the opinion that the union of soul and body is not for

the good of the soul St. Thomas gives the following argument:
• • • secundum hoc non esset anima corpori unita propter
melius animae, quia secundum hoc pejus intelligeret
corpori unita quam separata; sed hoc esset solum propter
melius corporis: quod est irrationabile, cum materia
sit propter formam, et non e converso.
~.Theol., I.q.89.a.l.,c.
st. Thomas states clearly the difficulty to be found in his own position
on the question of the union of soul and body.

If, as experience proves,

the soul when united to the body can understand only through the body, how
can the separated soul understand anything?
Si aut em ponamus, quod anima ex sua natura habeat ut
intelligat convertendo se ad phantasmata, cum natura
animae post mortem corporis non mutetur, videtur quod
anima tunc naturaliter nihil possit intelligere, cum
non sint ei praesto phantasmata ad quae convertatur.
~.Theol., I.q.89.a.l.,c.
The separated soul cannot understand by innate species, for it has no
such species to which it can turn.

As the separated soul no longer has sense

imagination, it cannot understand by species abstracted.

It cannot under-

stand by species once abstracted and now preserved for in that case the soul
of a child would understand nothing, for it has no preserved species.

Nor

can the soul be dependent on species infused by God, for that would not be
of nature but of grace.
Sed non intelligit per species innatas, quia a principio
est sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum; neque per
species quas tunc abstrahat a rebus, quia non habet organa
sensus et imaginationis, quibus mediantibus species intelligibiles abstrahuntur a rebus; neque etiam per species prius
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abstractas et in anima conservatas, quia sic anima pueri
nihil intelligeret post mortem; neque etiam per species
intelligibiles divinitus influxas: haec enim cognitio non
esset naturalis, de qua nunc agitur, sed gratiae •• •
~.Theol., I.q.89.a.l.,obj.3.
st. Thomas further develops the fact that the separated soul cannot be de•
pendent on species formerly abstracted and now preserved in the soul.

Not

only would the souls of children understand nothing after death, but adults
would be unable to know anything more than they know on earth, which view
cannot be accepted •
• • • species receptae prius, et conservatae non sufficiunt
ad cognitionem quam necesse est ponere in anima separata,
tum propter animas puerorum, tum propter hoc quod multa
erunt cognita ab anima separata quae nunc non cognosountur
a nobis, ut poenae inferni, et alia huiusmodi.
DeVer. q.l9.a.l.,c.
st. Thomas offers a solution to the difficulty in the question of the
knowledge of the separated soul by pointing out that each thing's mode of
operation follows its mode of existence.

Since the soul has one mode of

existence when united to the body and another when separated from it, it
follows that the soul has a different mode of operation when united to the
body than when separated from it, the nature of the soul remaining the same.
Thus when united to the body, the soul understands by turning to the phantasms which are supplied by means of bodily organs.

When separated from the

body, the soul understands by turning to things that are simply intelligible,
that is, by participated species which the soul shares with the angels,
though in a lesser degree.

~bile

these participated species arise from the

Divine Light, it does not follow necessarily that this mode of understanding
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is Uilllatural to the soul, for God is the author of the influx of the light
of nature as well as the light of grace.
• • .anima separata • • • intelligit • • • per species
ex influentia divini luminis participatas, quarum anima
fit particeps, sicut et aliae substantiae separatae,
qua.m.vis inferiori modo. Unde tam cito cessante conversione ad corpus, ad corpus, ad superiora convertitur.
Nee ta.m.en propter hoc cognitio vel potentia non est
naturalis: quia Deus est auctor non solum influentiae
gratuiti luminis, sed etia.m. naturalis.
~.Theol., I.q.89.a.l.ad 3um.
Now to be united to the body is natural to the soul, while to be separated
from it is contrary to the soul as form, as is said in the Summa Theologica
Si enim animae naturale est corpori uniri, esse sine
corpore est sibi contra natura.m., et sine corpore axistens non habet suae naturae perfectionem.
(I.q.ll8.a.3.)
In another place it is said:
Est igitur contra natura.m. animae absque corpore esse.
Nihil aute.m quod est contra natura.m., potest esse per•
petuum.
~·~·Gent., IV.79.
As form, it belongs to the very nature of the soul to be united to the body.
Not being in itself a complete specific nature, the soul requires the body.
Since, however, the soul is an intellectual principle, its highest and most
proper operation is to understand •
• • • intelligere est maxima et propria operatic animae.
De Anima. q.un.a.l5
For an intellectual substance, to exist is to know and will.
soul will continue to know even when separated from the body.

Therefore, the
Because of

the weakness of its intellectual power, the soul, unlike angels, receives
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its most perfect knowledge by abstracting from the phantasm which exists in
a corporeal organ.

The separated soul, while able to carry on its proper

operation, which is to know, will gather its knowledge by turning to objects
which are simply intelligible.

This mode of knowledge is beyond, but not

contrary to, the nature of the soul.

Thus:

• • .modus operandi uniuscujusque rei sequitur modum
essendi, cum unitur corpori, et cum fuerit a corpora
separata, manente tamen eadem animae natura • • •.Anima
igitur secundum istum modum essendi quo corpori est
unita, competit modus intelligendi per conversionem
ad phantasmata oorporum • • • cum autem fuerit a corpore
separata, competit ei modus intelligendi per conversionem ad ea quae sunt intelligibilia simpliciter,
sicut et aliis substantiis a corpore separatis. Unde
modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata est
animae naturalis, sicut et corpori uniri; sed esse
separatam a corpore est praeter rationem suae naturae;
et sin~lioiter intelligere sine conversione ad phantasmata est ei praeter naturam• • •
~.Theol., I.q.89.a.l.,o.
A second difficulty arises here.

Since it is better to understand by

turning to the simple intelligible objects, and since nature is always
directed towards the better, why does not the soul understand naturally by
this mode?

This difficulty can be answered by considering that although in

itself it is better to understand by turning to the simple intelligible objects, for the soul this mode of understanding is less noble.

This is be-

cause the soul is the lowest of intellectual substances and the farthest
from the Divine Light through which the intellective power exists.

In its

principle this light is one and simple, but the more the creature departs
from its first principle, the more the light is broken up, just as with light
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rays diverging from the sun.

God, by His one Essence, understands all;

superior intellects understand through fgwer and more universal forms than
do inferior intellects.

This is because of the greater efficacy of the in•

tellectual power in the superior intellects.

The human soul, which is on

the horizon of the spiritual and material worlds, has the least intellectual
power, and consequently is the least capable of embracing more universal
forms.

The soul must then get its most perfect knowledge through forms less

capable of embracing many objects, that is, through forms abstracted from
individual material things.

It follows then, that for the human soul, know-

ledge acquired through universal forms would be vague and confused.
lar case is seen among men of different intellectual ability.

A simi-

Those who

have better intellects understand through more universal forms; while those
who have inferior intellects, in order to have perfect knowledge, must have
each particular explained to them •
• • • in cognitivis aliquis qui est elevatioris intellectus, ex paucis principiis penes se retentis habet
in promptu procedere ad varias conclusiones, ad quas
pervenire non possunt qui sunt hebetioris ingenii nisi
per varias inductiones, et per principia particulariter
coaptata conclusionibus.
~·~·· q.s.a.lO.,c.
St. Thomas states his argument thus:
Considerandum est igitur quod etsi intelligere per
conversionem ad superiora sit simpliciter nobilius
quam intelligere per conversionem ad phantasmata;
tamen ille modus intelligendi, prout erat possibilis
animae, erat imperfectior. Quod sit patet: In
omnibus enim substantiis intellectualibus invenitur
virtus intellectiva per influentiam divini luminis;
quod quidem in primo principia est unum et simplex;
et quanto magis creaturae intellectuales distant a
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primo principia, tanto magis dividitur illud lumen.
et diversificatur, sicut accidit in lineis a centro
egredientibus. Et inde est quod Deus per unam suam
essentiam omnia intelligit. Superiores autem intellectualium substantiarum etsi per plures for.mas
intelligant, tamen intelligunt per pauciores et magis
universales et virtuosiores ad comprehensionem rerum,
propter efficaciam virtutis intellectivae quae est in
eis. In inferioribus autem sunt formae plures, et
minus universales, et minus efficaces ad comprehensionem rerum, in quantum deficiunt a virtute intellectiva superiorum. Si ergo inferiores substantiae
haberent formas in illa universalitate in qua habent
superiores, quia non sunt tantae efficaciae in intelligendo, non acciperent per eas perfectam cognitionem
de rebus, sed in quadam communitate et confusione • • •
~.Theel., I.q.89.a.l.c.
Since the difficulty of the question concerning the knowledge of the
separated soul arises from the very nature of the soul, in order to solve
the problem it will be necessary to consider the doctrine of St. Thomas on
the nature of the soul and its union with the body.

It will then be clear

that the human soul, although incomplete in itself and requiring to be united
to the body, is yet a subsisting thing, and in virtue of this subsistence is
capable of existing without the body.
exist is to know and will.

But for the intellectual soul, to

Consequently, the separated soul will be able to

understand without reference to objects existing in corporeal organs.

Dif-

ficulties arise concerning the mode of operation proper to the separated
soul, but st. Thomas offers a solution to these.

p

CHAPTER I
In the doctrine of st. Thomas the human soul is an immaterial subsistent

thing, the substantial for.m of the human body.

It is the first principle of

life·in the body and therefore it cannot itself be a body:

for to be a

principle of life does not belong to a body as such, otherwise every body
would be a principle of life.

That any body is a living thing or a principle

of life or of activity is due to a first principle of life which is not itself a body, but the act of a body.

The eye is a principle of activity,

but it is so only in virtue of the soul and when the body is no longer animated by the soul, the eye loses its power •
• • • anima dicitur esse primum principium vitae in his
quae apud nos vivunt • • • YAnifestum est enim quod esse
principium vitae, vel vivens, non convenit corpori ex
hoc quod est corpus: alioquin omne corpus asset vivens,
aut principium vitae. Convenit igitur alicui corpori
quod sit vivens, vel etiam principium vitae per hoc quod
est tale corpus. Quod autem est actu tale habet hoc ab
aliquo principia, quod dicitur actus ejus. Anima igitur
quae est primum principium vitae, non est corpus sed corporis actus • • •
~.Theol., I.q.,75.a.l.c.
Further, since the human soul is the principle of intellectual life and has
its own proper activity which is not the activity of an organ, it must be
not only incorporeal but also something subsistent, as st. Thomas says:
• • .necesse est dicere id quod est principium intellectualis operationis, quod dioimus animam hominis,
esse quoddam principium incorporeum et subsistens • • •
~.Theol., I.q.75.a.2.o.

9
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At the same time it belongs to the very nature of the soul to be united to
the body.
• •• necesse est dicere, quod intellectus, qui est
intellectualis operationis principium, sit humani corporis forma.
Sum.Theol., I.q.76.a.l.c.
Concerning the question of the subsistence of the human soul st. Thomas
takes a middle course between two extremes; on the one hand that the soul is
not a subsistent thing, and on the other that the soul is a complete specific
nature in itself.
subsistent and

He has to meet the objection that the human soul is not

~

particular thing, and that the term,

~

particular

thing, can be said only of that which is composed of soul and body.

Thus it

is objected:
Videtur quod anima humana non sit aliquid subsistens.
Quod enim est subsistens, dicitur hoc aliquid. Anima
autem non est hoc aliquid, sed compositum ex anima et
corpore. Ergo anima non est aliquid subsistens.
Sum.Theol., I.q.75.a.2.ob.

-

.

The second opinion regarding the subsistence of the soul is that the soul is
not only something subsistent but that it is in itself a complete specific
nature.

Plato is one St. Thomas has in mind as holding this opinion.

Thus

for both st. Thomas and Plato the soul is something subsistent, but the
term, something subsistent, is not understood in the same sense by both
philosophers.
According to St. Thomas' interpretation, Plato holds that the soul is
not only something subsistent, which St. Thomas also holds, but that it is a
complete specific nature, which st. Thomas does not adrrdt.

St. Thomas gives

p
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the following as Plato's doctrine:
••• posuit Plato quod anima humana non solum par sa
sad quod etiam haberet in se completam
naturam speciai in anima esse~ dicens hominem non esse
aliquid compositum ex anima at corpore, sed animam
corpori advenientem. • •
E!_ Anima, q.un.a.l.
subsistaret~

In order to make clear his own stand on the question of the subsistence

of the human soul st. Thomas distinguishes between the two senses in which
the term,

~

particular thing, may be taken.

not an accident or a material form can be

In one sense anything that is

called~

particular thing; while

in the second sense only wholes are subsistent and those things which are
parts of wholes are excluded.

Thus, whiteness or the form of an apple cannot

be called this particular thing in any sense, since neither has any existence
apart from its subject.

A hand can be

first sense but not in the
body is

a~

second~

called~

particular thing in the

for a hand, even when separated from the

somethinR, yet it is but a part of the whole body.

The soul

likewise can be called this something in the first sense, but in the second
only that which is composed of soul and body can be called

~

particular

thing.
• •• hoc aliquid potest accipi dupliciter, uno modo
pro quocumque subsistente, alia modo pro subsistente completo in natura alicujus speciai. Primo
modo axcludit inhaerentiam accidantis, at formae
materialis. Secondo modo excludit etiam imperfectionem partis. Unde manus posset dioi hoc aliquid
prima modo, sed non secunda modo; Sic igitur cum
anima humana sit pars spaoiei humana, potest dici
~ aliquid prima modo, quasi subsistans, sed non
secunda modo: sic enim oompositum ex anima et
corpore dicitur hoc aliquid.
~.Theol., I.q.75.a.2 ad lum.
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In another ?lace St. Thomas gives the following:
• • .unde etiam nee hoc aliquid dici potest si per hoo
aliquid intelligatur hypostasis vel persona, vel individuum in genera aut specie collocatum. Sed si hoo
aliquid dioatur omne quod potest per se subsistere, sic
anima est hoc aliquid.
E! Spiritua~ Creaturis, a.2.ad 16um.
In refuting those who hold that the human soul is not something subsistent St. Thomas first shows that the soul can neither be a body nor
operate through a bodily organ, and that as the act of a body it must have
an operation of its own, which operation belongs only to a self-subsisting
thing.

Since the soul is capable of knowing all material things, it oan have

no matter in its own nature.

This is because the presence of any matter in

the soul would impede the lmowledge of all other things! just as to a man
with fever all things taste bitter, being affected by the bitter humors of
the tongue.

Moreover, to know is not the act of any body.

Since therefore

the soul is an intellectual principle, it must have an operation in which
the body has no part.

Now in order to have an operation apart from the

body, the soul must be something subsistent, as is clear from the following.
• • .impossibile est quod intelligat per organum
corporeum, quia natura determinata illius organi
corporei prohiberet cognitionem omnium oorporum;
sicut si aliquis determinatus color sit non solum
in pupilla, sed etiam in vase vitreo, liquor infusus
ejusdem coloris videtur.
Ipsum igitur intellectuale prinoipium, quod dicitur
mens, vel intelleotus, habet operationem per se, cui
non oommunicat corpus. Nihil autem potest per sa
operatari nisi quod per sa subsistit; non enim est
operari nisi antis in actu. Unde eo modo aliquid
operatur quo est; propter quod non dicimus quod
calor calefacit, sed calidum. Relinquitur igitur

13
humanam, quae dioitur intellectus, vel mens,
esse aliquid incorporeum et subsistens.
~.Theol., I.q.75.a.2.c.

an~

e

st. Thomas opposes the opinion that the human soul is not only something
subsistent but that it possesses in itself a complete specific nature.

For

the soul, he says, is that through which the body has life, and since life
is the existence of living things, it follows that it is through the soul
that the body has its existence as a human body.

Now that through which

anything has existence is its form, therefore, the soul is the form of the
body.

Because the soul is the form of the body, it is through the soul that

the body gets its species, that is, its existence as a human body.

But if

the soul were in the body as a sailor in a ship, it could not give the body
or the parts of the body their species.

The presence of the sailor does

not give existence to the ship, nor does his absence deprive the ship of
its species.

The ship is still a ship whether the sailor is in it or not,

and the sails are sails whether the sailor is furling or spreading them or
not.

But when the soul has left the body, the body is no longer a human

body except equivocally, nor is the eye in the dead body a human eye except
in an equivocal sense.

Besides in this case death, which is the separation

of soul and body, would not result in the substantial corruption of anything.

Sailor and ship are still sailor and ship whether separated or not.

Their union was accidental and their separation affects nothing substantial.
Nothing remains then except to admit that the soul is a

~

something; not

as if it had in itself a complete specific nature, but because as form of
the body it perfects. the nature of man.

And so it is both a form and a

p
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-

this something.
Nanifestum est enim id quo vivit corpus, animam
esse; vivere autem est esse viventium: anima igitur est quo corpus humanum habet esse actu. Huiusmodi autem forma est. Est igitur anima humana corporis forma. Item si anima asset in corpore, sicut
nauta in navi, non daret speciem corpori, neque
partibus eius; cuius contrarium apparet ex hoc quod
recedente anima, singulae partes non retinent pristinum nomen nisi aequivoce. Dicitur enim oculus
mortui aequivoce oculus, sicut pictus, aut lapideus,
et simile est de aliis partibus. Et praeterea si
anima asset in corpore sicut nauta in navi, sequeretur quod unio animae et corporis asset accidentalis.
Mors igitur, quae inducit eorum separationem, non
asset corruptio substantialia; "quod patet esse
falsum. Relinquitur igitur quod anima est hoc aliquid, ut per se subsistere, non quasi habens in se
completam speciem, sed quasi perficiens speciem
humanam ut forma corporis; et sic similiter est
forma, et hoc aliquid.
De Anima, q.un.a.l.c.
st. Thomas' stand on the question of the subsistence of the human soul

might be summed up as follows:
• • .anima humana non est hoc aliquid sicut substantia,
oompletam speoiam habens, sed sicut pars habentis
speoi«m oompletam, ut ex dictis patet.
~Anima, q.un.a.l. ad 3um.
Since the soul is the form of the body, it cannot be said that man is a soul
making use of a body, nor that the soul is man.

The soul itself is not a

complete species, but is a part of the human species, and matter, the body,
is the other part of the species.

st. Thomas interprets Plato as holding

that the soul is man, and that the soul makes use of the body as man makes
use of clothes •
• • •Plato posuit quod homo non sit aliquid compositum
ex anima et corpore, sed quod ipsa anima utens corpore
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sit homo; sicut Petrus nan est aliquid compositum ax
homine et indUmento. sed homo utens indumento.
Sum.Cont.~ •• II.c.57.
In meeting this opinion St. Thomas points out the two ways in which the
statement.

~ soul_!!~·

may be taken.

He says that while man is a soul

yet any particular man. as Socrates, is not a soul only but is composed of
soul and body.
iarticular

Taken in the strict sense. that man is man only as this

~·

the soul cannot be called man.

up of matter and form.

All natural things are made

Neither the matter nor the form P?ssesses in itself

a complete specific nature, and in man neither the body nor the soul alone
can be called man.

This is evident since the nature of anything can be

known by its proper operation, for whatever performs the operations proper

to a thing is itself proper to that thing.

If then man were a soul all the

operations of a man could be attributed to the soul alone, without reference
to the body.

Now some of the operations proper to man, such as feeling,

cannot be attributed to the soul alone, but to the compositum, as is said:
• • • quaedam potentiae oomparantur ad anima.m solam sicut
ad subjectum, ut intellectus et voluntas • • • Quaedam
vero potentiae sunt in conjuncto sicut in subjecto,
sicut omnes potentiae sensitivae partis et nutritivae.
~.Theol., I.q.77.a.8.c.
It must then be admitted that the soul is not man, but what is composed of
soul and body is man.
• • .quod animrum esse hominem dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, quod homo sit anima, sed hie homo non
sit anima. sed compositum ex anima et corpore, • • • Alio
vero modo potest intelligi sic quod etiam haec anima
sit hie homo; et hoc quidem sustinere posset, si poneretur
quod animae sensitivae operatio asset ejus propria sine
corpore: quia omnes operationes quae attribuuntur homini,
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convenirent soli animae. Illud autem est unaquaeque
res quod operatur operationes illius rei; unde illud
est homo quod operatur operationes hominis ••• sentire
non est operatic animae tantum. Cum igitur sentire
sit quaedam operatio hominis, licet non propria,
manifestum est quod homo non est anima tantum, sed
aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore.
Plato vero ponens sentire esse proprium animae,
ponere potuit quod homo asset anima utens corpore.
Sum.Theol., I.q.75.a.4.c.
Since then the soul is not itself a complete specific nature but needs
the body to complete it, and since matter exists for the sake of form, it
is necessary·to seek in the soul itself the reason why it is united to the
body.

Ncrw the perfection of the soul consists in the knowledge of truth,

which truth it attains through the intellect; but the soul is so constituted
that it must be united to the body and thus receive knowledge of sensible
things from the things themselves.

Experience proves that the soul under-

stands by turning to the phantasms which are supplied by the body.
its

o~~

Thus for

sake the soul must be united to the body.
Ultima perfectio animae humanae cansistet in cognitione
veritatis, quae est per intellectum. Ad hoc autem quod
perficiatur anima in cognitione veritatis, indiget uniri
corpori: quia intelligit per phantasmata, quae non sunt
sine corpore. Ergo necesse est ut anima corpori uniatur
ut forma, et sit hoc aliquid.
E! Anima, q.un.a.l.c.

The human soul is the lowest among the intellectual substances and is
not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth as are the angels; therefore
the human intellect must gather its knowledge from material things.

In

order to do this the human soul must have not only the power of understanding
but also the power of feeling.

This power of feeling is exercised in the

p_·--------------------------~
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action of the senses, and cannot be performed without a bodily organ.

It is

evident that a man deprived of one sense has no knowledge of the proper object of that sense; for example, a man born blind has no idea of color.
such

wou~d

not be the case were the soul able to understand without turning

to the phantasm.

It is clear then that the soul, for its own sake, must be

united to a body that can serve as an organ of sense •
• • • cum materia sit propter formam, at non e converso;
ex parte animae oportet accipere rationem, quale debeat
esse corpus cui unitur; • • • dioitur quod anima non solum
est corporis forma et motor, sed etiam finis • • • manifestum
(est) quod ideo naturale est animae humanae corpori uniri,
quia cum sit infima in ordine rerum sensibilium; non habet
anima humana intelligibiles species sibi naturaliter inditas, quibus in operationem propriam exira possit, quae
est intelligere, sicut habent superiores substantiae intellectuales; sed est in potentia ad eas, cum sit sicut tabula
rasa, in qua nihil est scriptum, ut dicitur • • • Unde oportet
quod species intelligibiles a rebus exterioribus accipiat
mediantibus potentiis sensitivis, quae sine corporeis organis operationes proprias habere non possunt. Unde at
anima humana neoesse est corpori uniri. Si ergo propter hoc
anima humana unibilis est corpori, quia indiget accipere
species intelligibiles a rebus mediante sensu; necessarium
est quod corpus, cui anima rationis unitur, tale sit ut
possit esse aptissimum ad rapraesentandum intellectui
species sensibiles, ex quibus in intellectu intelligibiles species resultant • • •
~Anima, q.un.a.s.c.
It does not follow from this that the soul needs the body in the sense that
it operates through a material organ, but rather, the body supplies the
material with which the soul works •
• • • corpus requiritur ad actionem intallectus, non
sicut organum quo talis actio axarcaatur, sad ratione
objecti; phantasmata anim comparatur ad intallactum sicut
color ad visum. Sic autam indigare corpore non ramovet
intallactum esse subsistentam; alioquin animal non asset
aliquid subsistens, cum indigeat exterioribus sensibi-
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libus ad sentiendum.
~.Theol.,

I.q.75.a.2. ad 3um.

It is necessary then that the soul be united in some way to the body.
Not can this union be an accidental one, for in that case man would not be
one substantially, but only accidentally, and consequently neither understanding nor feeling could be attributed to man properly, for understanding
is not proper to bodies, nor feeling to intellectual substances •
• • • in nullo corpore est ni~i una forma substantialia:
cujus est ratio triplex. Prima est, quia si plures,
sequens non erit forma substantialis, quae facit esse
~impliciter; sed solum accidentalis, quae facit hoc.
Item, si sit acquisita forma substantialia, non erit
generatio simpliciter. Ite~ quia non asset compositum
ex anima et corpore unum simpliciter, sed duo simpliciter et unum per accidens.
Quodl., a.7a.9.
It remains, then, to consider the nature of this union.
st. Thomas maintains that man is differentiated from other beings of
the animal genus by his rationality, which he has in virtue of his intellectual principle.

Since difference is derived from form, it follows that

the intellectual principle is the for.m of man.

He says:

• • • unumquodque sortitur speciam per propriam formam.
Sed homo est homo in quantum est rationalis. Ergo
anima rationalis est propria forma hominis.
E!, .Anima, q•un.a.l.c.
And in another place:
• • • differentia sumitur a forma rei. Sed differentia
constitutiva hominis est rationale, quod dicitur de
homine ratione intellectivi principii. Intellectivum
ergo principium est forma hominis.
~.Theol., I.q.76.a.l.c.

•

,...-
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Moreover the soul is the first thing by which the body lives, because it is
the first principle of all man's acts, as feeling, local motion, etc.

Since

anything acts in virtue of its form, the intellectual soul must be united to
the body as its form.

Thus:

• • • necesse est dicere, quod intellectus, qui est
intellectualis operationis principium, sit humani
corporis forma. Illud enim quo primo aliquid
operatur, est forma ejus cui operatio attribuitur;
sicut quo primo sanatur corpus, est sanitas, et 'quo
primo scit anima, est scientia; unde sanitas est forma
corporis, at scientia est forma quodammodo animae. Et
hujus ratio est, quia nihil agit nisi secundum quod
est actu. Unde quo aliquid est actu, eo agit. Manifestum est autem quod primum quo corpus vivit, est
anima. Et cum vita manifestetur secundum diversas
operationes in diversis gradibus viventium, id quo
primo operamur unumquodque horum operum vitae, est
anima. Anima enim est primum quo nutrimur, et sentimus,
at movemur secundum locum, at similiter quo primo intelligimus. Hoc ergo principiUm quo primo intelligimus,
sive dicatur intellectus, sive anima intellectiva, est
forma corporis • • •
~.Theol., I.q.76.a.l.c.
In this doctrine St. Thomas has to meet the objection that the human
soul cannot be united to the body as form, for such a union would imply that
the intellect has a determinate nautra, and would therefore be unable to
know all things, which is contrary to the nature of the soul.

Any power or

faculty exercised through a corporeal organ is limited; as sight is exercised through an organ, the eye, and the object of sight is necessarily
limited to color.

Moreover, any matter in the soul would impede the know-

ledge of all other things, as is the case when liquid placed in a colored
glass appears to be colored.

The objection is true in its conclusions, but

~~·----------------~
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it does not affect the question at hand.

Although the soul is united to the

body as form, this union does not affect the proper operation of the soul.
The act of understanding itself, is in no way exercised through the body.
st. Thomas says:
• • .anima sit forma corporis secundum essentiam animae
intellectualis, non taman secundum operationem intellectualem.
~Anima, q.un.a.9.c.
While the soul requires the body and is united to it as form, yet the soul is
not a purely material for.m, submersed in matter, as are non-intellectual
forms.
Non autem oportet substantiam intellectualem esse
formam materialem, quamvis esse ejus sit in materia,
• • .non enim est in materia siout materia immersa,
vel a materia totaliter comprehensa, sed alio modo • • •
~-~·~·· n.s9.
st. Thomas answers the objection in the following manner:
• • • virtus intellectiva non est virtus alicujus organi
corporalis, sicut virtus visiva est oculi: intelligere
enim est actus qui non potest exercari per organum corporale, sicut exercetur visio. Sed in materia est, in
quantum ipsa anima, cujus est haec virtus, est corporis
forma • • •
Sufficit enim ad hoc quod homo possit intelligere
omnia per intellectum, at ad hoc quod intellectus intelligat omnia immaterialia, et universalia, quod virtus
intellectiva non est corporis actus.
~.Theol., I.q.75.a.l.adl.
It might seem that as the human soul and body are not of the same genus the
soul could not be united to the body as its form, the soul being in the
genus of incorporeal substances and the body corporeal.
bered that

rr~tter

It must be remem-

and form make up one thing; now if the soul is the form of
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the body, the result will be one substantial thing, the composite,man.
Neither the soul, although a subsistent thing, nor the body, is in itself a
complete specific nature.

Each requires the other; the body must be actu-

alized by the soul, and the soul, as form, must animate a body suited to it.
Diversity of genus in no way impedes this union, and it is only in virtue
of this union that one can speak of species or genus, for the soul gives to
the body its species, and the body completes the specific nature of the soul •
• • • necesse est, si anima forma corporis, quod animae
et corporis sit unum esse commune, quod est esse compositi. Nee hoc impeditur per hoc quod anima et corpus
sint diversorum generum: nam neque anima neque corpus sunt
in specie vel genera n~s~ per reductionem, sicut partes
reducuntur ad speciem vel genus totius.
~Anima, q.un.a.l.ad 13.
Averroes attempted to explain the union of soul and body through the
intelligible species, saying that as the intelligible species were in both
the phantasm and the passive intellect, they served as a link between the
body, in which the phantasm is, and the passive intellect, which is in the
soul.

Although it is true that the intelligible species are in both soul

and body as was said, yet this cannot serve as the union between soul and
body, for it does not explain how the act of the intellect would be the act
of the man.

This will be seen when one considers that phantasms are to the

intellect what colors are to the sense of sight, proper objects.

Now the

species of phantasms are in the passive intellect as the species of color
are in the sight.

The colors,

in~ges

of which are in the sight, may be in a

gle.ss window, but we cannot say that the window sees.
the colors are is merely seen.

The window in which

It follows then that the phantasms which
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are in corporeal organs may be known by the intellect, but it does not folloW that man knows; rather, he or his phantasms are known, as the colors in
the glass were seen.

St. Thomas answers Averroes in the following manner:

Hanc autem unionem Commentator • • • dicit esse per specie.m
intelligibile.m; quae quidem habet duplex subjectum, unum
scilicet intellectum possibilem, et aliud ipsa phantasmata,
quae sunt in organis corporeis. Et sic per speciem intelligibilem continuatur intellectus possibilis corpori hujus vel
illius hominis. Sed ista continuatio vel unio non sufficit
ad hoc quod actio intellectus sit actio Socratis. Et hoc
patet per similitudinem in sensu, ex quo Aristoteles procedit
ad considerandum ea quae sunt intellectus. Sic enim se
habent phantasmata ad intellectum, • • • sicut colores ad visum.
Sicut ergo species colorum sunt in visu, ita species phantasmatum sunt in intellectu possibili. Patet autem quod ex hoc
quod colores sunt in pariete, quorum similitudines sunt in
visu, actio visus non attribuitur parieti; non enim dicimus,
quod paries videat, sed magis quod videatur. Ex hoc ergo
quod species phantasmata sunt in intellectu possibili, non
sequitur quod Socrates, in quo sunt phantasmata, intelligat;
sed quod ipse, vel ejus phantasmata intelligantur.
~.Theel., I.q.76.a.l.c.
St. Thomas has to meet the objection that the soul is not the form of
the body, but is united to the body as motor.
answered.

This objection can easily be

A motor does not confer species on the thing moved.

If, then,

the soul be united to the body as motor the soul would give motion to the
body, but would not give it species; therefore the separation of soul and
body would not result in the corruption of the body.

But the parts of the

body, eyes, hands, etc., are such actually only in virtue of the soul.
soul cannot be united to the body as motor only.
:Mobile non sortitur speciem a suo motore. Si igitur
anima non coniungitur corpori nisi sicut motor mobili,
corpus, et partes eius non consequuntur species ab anima.
Abeunte igitur anima, remanebit corpus, et partes eiusdem speciei. Hoc autem est manifeste falsum: nam caro,

The

r:-·--------------------~
23

et os, et manus, et huius~modi partes, post abscessum animae
non dicuntur nisi aequivoce, quum nulli harum partium propria
operatio adsit, quae speciem consequitur. Non igitur unitur
anima corpore solum sicut motor mobili • • •
~·~·~·' II.c.57,3.
Moreover the action of the motor can be attributed to the thing moved only
as to an instrument, as the action of a carpenter to a saw.

Understanding

could than be attributed to Socrates only as to an instrument.

This Dnplies

that one understands through a corporeal instrument, which cannot be accepted.
• • .actio motoria nunquam attribuitur moto nisi sicut
instrumento, sicut actio carpentarii serrae. Si igitur
intelligere attribuitur Socrati, quia est actio motoria
ejus, sequitur quod attribuatur ei sicut instrumento:
quod est contra Philosophum • • • qui vult quod intelligere non sit per instrumentum corporeum.
.
~.Theol., I.q.76.a.l.ad 3um.
Again, the essence of man is composed of matter and form.

The intellect is

not the matter, therefore unless it be the form it is outside the essence of
man.

Then the intellect would be to the man as motor to the thing moved.

Now the act of the intellect remains in the agent and does not pass into
something else, as the action of heat, for example, passes into the thing
heated.

The act of understanding could not be attributed to man simply by

reason of his being moved by his intellect, any more than the action of the
motor can be attributed to the thing moved •
• • • cum Socrates sit quoddam individuum in natura, cujus
essentia est una, composita ex materia et forma, si intellectus non sit forma eius sequitur quod sit praeter essentiam ejus; et sic intellectus comparabitur ad totum
Socratem sicut motor ad motum. Intellegere autem est
actio quiescens in agente, non autem transciens in alterum,
sicut calefactio. Non ergo intellegere potest attribui
Socrati propter hoc quod est motus ab intellectu.
~.Theol., I.q.76.a.l.
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If the intellect be united to Socrates as motor, that is, as a part of
socrates in·the sense that a hand is a part, the action of the intellect cannot be attributed to Socrates.

Although we can attribute the action of a

part to the whole, as the action of the eye to man, yet we cannot attribute
the action of one part to any other part, strictly speaking.
say the hand sees because the eye sees.

Thus, we do not

Therefore we cannot say Socrates

understands because the intellect understands •
• • • actio partis attribuitur toti, ut actio oculi
homini; numquam tamen attribuitur alii parti, nisi
forte per accidens; non enim dicimus, quod manus
videat, propter hoc quod oculus videt. Si ergo ex
intelleotu, et Socrate sit unum, actio intellectus
non potest attribui Socrati. Si vera Socrates est
tatum, quod componitur ex unione intellectus ad
reliqua quae sunt Socrates, et tamen intellectus non
unitur aliis quae aunt Socrates nisi sicut motor;
sequitur quod Socrates non sit unum simpliciter, et
per consequens nee ens simpliciter, sic enim aliquid
est ens, quo modo et unum.
~.Theol., I.q.76.a.l.c.
St. Thomas holds that the intellectual principle is the form of man and
for this reason man understands.

The proper operation of man as man is to

understand, and in this he surpasses all other animals.

A being derives its

species from its form, and since its form is the principle of operation, it
f~llows

that the intellectual soul is the form of the body.

find some more, some less, noble.

Among forms we

The higher the form the less it is merged

in matter and wholly compassed by it.

The form of a plant surpasses that of

a metal and has an operation above that of a metal.

The form, or soul, of

an animal is superior to that of a plant, and surpasses the purely vegetative
soul in its power of operation.

The human soul is the highest of forms and
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is more excellent than matter, having a power and operation in which matter
has nomare.

This power is the intellect.

Relinquitur ergo solus modus quem Aristoteles ponit • • •
quod hie homo intelligit, quia principium intellectivum
est forma ipsius. Sic ergo ex ipsa operatione intellectus apparet quod intellectivum principium unitur
corpori ut forma.
Poteat etiam idem manifestari ex ratione speciei
humanae. Natura enim uniuscujusque rei ex ejus operationa ostenditur. Propria autem operatic hominis, in ·
quantum est homo, est intelligere; per hanc enim omnia
alia animalia transcendit • • • in hac operatione, sicut
in propria hominis, ultimam felicitatem constituit.
Oportet ergo quod homo secundum illud speciem sortiatur
quod est hujus operationis principium. Sortitur autem
unumquodque specie.m per per propriam formam. Relinquitur
ergo quod intellectivum principium sit propria hominis
forma.
Sed considerandum est, quod quanta ••• forma est
nobilior, tanto magis dominatur materiae corporali, et
minus ei immergitur, et magis sua operatione, vel virtute
excedi t eam; unde videmus quod forma mixti corporis habet
aliam operationem, quae non causatur ex qualitatibus elementaribus. Et quanto magis proceditur in nobilitate formarum,
tanto magis invenitur virtus formae materiam elementarem
excedere, sicut anima vegetabilis plus quam forma elementaris, et anima sensibilia plus quam anima vegetabilis.
Anima autem humana est ultima in nobilitata formarum. Unde
in tantum sua virtute excedit materiam corporalem, quod
habet aliquam operationem et virtutem in qua nullo modo
communicat materia corporalis, et haec virtus dicitur
intellectus.
Sum.Theol., I.q.76.a.l.c.
The objection has been raised that it is unfitting that the immaterial,
intellectual soul be united to the material body as form, since matter is
proportionate to the form •
• • •non enim forma est propter materiam, sed materia
propter formam.
~ ~~ q.5.a.5.c.
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To answer this difficulty it must be remembered that in the intellectual
order the intellectual soul holds the same place that prime matter holds in
the material order, that is, the lowest in its sphere.
potentiality; it has a capacity to receive for.ms.
capable of receiving forms.

Prime matter is

The soul likewise is

Knowledge is a form of the soul, and the soul

is not naturally gifted with species necessary-for its proper operation,
which is to understand.

The intellect is analagous to uninformed matter, or

to a tablet on which nothing is written.

In order to be informed the soul

must abstract intelligible species from exterior things, which operation
presupposes the action of the sensitive power.
cannot exist without corporeal organs.

Now this sensitive power

Therefore, it is necessary for the

immaterial soul to be united to a body most suited to its needs, that is,
provided with various organs.

st. Thomas makes this clear:

Est • • • manifestum, quod ideo naturale est animae humanae
corpori uniri, quia cum sit infima in ordine intellectualium
substantiarum, sicut materia prima est infima in ordine
rerum sensibilium; non habet anima humana intelligibilem
species sibi naturaliter inditas, quibus in operationem
propriam exira possit, quae est intelligere, sicut habent
superiores substantiae intellectuales; sed est in potentia
ad eas, cum sit sicut tabula rasa, in qua nihil est scriptum • • • Unde oportet quod species intelligibiles a rebus
exterioribus accipiat mediantibus potentiis sensitivis,
quae sine corporeis organis operationes proprias habere
non possunt. Unde et anima.m humanam necesse est corpori
un1r1. Si ergo propter hoc anima humana unibilis est
corpori, quia indiget accipere species intelligibiles a
rebus mediante sensu; necessarium est quod corpus cui
anima rationalis unitur, tale sit ut possit esse aptissimum ad repraesentandum intellectui species sensibiles, ex
quibus in intellectu intelligibiles species resultant.
Sic ergo oportet corpus cui anima rationalis unitur, esse
optima dispositum ad sentiendum. Sed cum plures sint
sensus, unus taman est qui est fundamentum aliorum, scilicet
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tactus, in quo principaliter tota natura sensitiva consistit •••• Cum igitur corpus cui anima rationalis
unitur, debeat esse optima dispositum ad nature.m sens"itivam necessarium est ut habeat convenientissimum organum
sensus tactus • • • Corpus cui anima rationalis unitur,
cum debeat esse convenientissimum ad sensum tactus,
oportet quod sit maxima reductum ad medium per aequalitatem co.mplexionis.
~Anima, q.un.a.s.c.
St. Thomas answers a second objection, that the intellectual soul, as
the highest of forms, should not be united to a corruptible body.
calls the definition of a soul, the first
having~

~;;!_~natural

He re-

organic body

potentially.

• • .anima est actus primus corporis physici organici
potentia vitam habentis.
~.Theol., I.q.76.a.5.c.
As act or form the soul must be united to a corporeal body.

In any matter

two conditions are to be found, one Which is chosen as suitable to a particular form, and another which is inherent in the matter itself.

For example,

a saw must be made of hard' matter in order that its proper function, cutting,
may be carried on.
material for a saw.

Consequently, a workman chases iron as the most fitting
Iron, by its nature, is subject to decay.

That the

iron will rust in no way implies that it is unsuitable material for a saw.
Nowthe proper operation of the intellectual soul is to gather its knowledge
from individual, material thin6s•

In order to do this the soul must have

not only the power of understanding, but also the power of feeling.

Since

feeling is proper to organic bodies capable of being animated, the soul must
be united to such a body.

All matter is by its nature subject to corruption.

Thus the human soul should be united to the body because the body is poten-
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tially sentient.

The fact that the body is corruptible does not affect the

suitability of such a union, any more than the corruptibility of the iron
made it unsuitable material for a saw •
• • • id quod consequitur materiam, dupliciter acc~p~
potest; uno modo secundum quod congruit formae; et hoc
est quod agens eligit in materia: alio modo non secundum
quod congruit formae, llmmO forte repugnat etiam formae et
fini, sed est ex necessitate materiae; et talis conditio
non est electa vel intenta ab agente; sicut artifex qui
facit serram ad secandum, quaerit ferrum, quia est materia
apta ad for.mam serrae et ad finem ejus propter suam duritiem. Invenitur taman in ferro aliqua conditio secundum
quam ferrUm non habet aptitudinem nee ad formam nee ad
finem, sicut quod est frangibile vel contrahens rubiginem
vel aliquid huiusmodi, quae sunt impeditiva finis; unde non
sunt electa ab agente, sed magis ab agente repudiarentur,
si asset possibile • • • Sic ergo homini est aliquid naturale
secundum suam formam, ut intelligere, vella et alia hujusmodi; aliqua vero sunt ei naturalia secundum suam materiam,
quod est corpus. Corporis autem humani conditio dupliciter
considerari potest; uno modo secundum aptitudinem ad formam;
alio modo secundum id quod consequitur in ipso secundum
necessitatem materiae tantum. Secundum aptitudinem quidem
ad formam, necessarium est corpus humanum esse ex elementis
compositum, et medie complexionatum. Cum enim anima humana
sit intellectiva in potentia, unitur corpori ut per sensus
accipiat species intelligibiles, quibus fit intelligens
actu • • •Autem sequitur ex necessitate materiae quod sit
corruptibile, secundum hanc conditionem non habet aptitudinem ad formam, sed magis repugnantiam ad formam. Et
quidem o.mnis corruptio cujuscumque rei naturalis, non
est secundum convenientiam ad formam • • •
~ 1~lo, q.5.a.5.c.

CHAPTER II
Since the soul is united to the body in order that it may carry on its
proper operation naturally, it might be well to consider the mode of this
operation before considering the soul's mode of operation when separated from
the body.

With regard to the objects of the soul's knowledge st. Thomas

holds that the soul knows corporeal things which are beneath it, itself and
the things contained in itself, and immaterial substances above it.

With

regard to the first group, material things, st. Thomas maintains that the
soul knows them through the intellect.

He thus opposes mere sensism, pheno-

menalism, and scepticism regarding the exterior world.
Early philosophers knew only material things and held the material alone
to be real.

These philosophers, as Heraclitus and Empedocles, observing

that bodies are in a state of perpetual flux taught that certain knowledge
of their nature is impossible.
is perpetually changing.

One cannot know the nature of a thing that

Plato, St. Thomas says, agreed that things of

sense are constantly changing, but he wished to avoid the error that certitude regarding the nature of things is impossible.
built up his doctrine of ideas.

In order to do this he

While admitting the constant change in

things he maintained that singular, sensible things are what they are in
virtue of their participation in another genus of beings, separated fram
matter and movement and consequently from change.
29

These beings, separate
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from material conditions, he called species or ideas.

The soul, he taught,

does not understand material things themselves, but rather, it understands
the separate ideas or species of these things.

was unreal and not the object of true knowledge.

For him the material world
St. Thomas rejects such a

doctrine on the grounds that since the species or ideas are apart from time
and motion, any knowledge of movement is excluded, and such knowledge is
proper to physics.

He likewise saysthat simply because one has a knowledge

of the separate species or ideas it does not follow that one can form a
judgement concerning sensible things.

Plato's error was the result of his

believing that the form of the thing known had necessarily to be in the
knower and in the things known in the same manner or mode.

He went beyond

the earlier pl1ilosophers in recognizing the Dmnaterial, and observing the
immateriality, universality and immobility of the form of the thing known as
it is present in the intellect, he concluded that the things themselves
must have an existence free from matter and change.

This is not necessary

however, for a thing received in a subject is present in that subject according to the mode of the subject, not according to the mode of the thing received.

Even in sensible things this is seen, for, as St. Thomas points

out, whiteness can be in one thing in a greater degree of intensity than in
another, according to the capacity of the receiver.

Likewise the form of a

thing can be present in its subject under the conditions of materiality,
changeability, and individuality.

.The form of an apple is present in the

apple under such conditions because of the nature of matter.

But that same
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form is present in the intellect in a different mode because the intellect is
imffiaterial.

Thus:
• • • Forma autem hujusmodi potest considerari dupliciter:
uno modo secundum esse quod habet in cognoscente; alio
modo secundum respectum quem habet ad rem cujus est
similitude. Secundum quidem primum respectum facit
cognoscentem actu cognoscere; sed secundum respectum
determinat cognitionem ad aliquod cognoscibile determinatum. Et ideo modus cognoscendi rem aliquam, est
secundum conditionem cognoscentis, in quo forma recipitur secundum modum eius. Non autem oportet quod res
cognita sit secundum modum cognoscentis, vel secundum
modum illum quo forma, quae est cognoscendi principium,
esse habet in cognoscente; unde nihil prohibet per
formas quae in mente immaterialiter existunt, res
materiales cognosci.
De Ver. q.lO.a.4.c.

st. Thomas refutes Plato's doctrine as follows:
Videtur autem in hoc Plato deviare a veritate; quia
c~~ aestimaret omnem cognitionem per modum alicujus
similitudinis esse, credidit quod forma cogniti ex
necessitate sit in cognoscente, eo modo quo est in
cognito. Consideravit autem, quod forma rei intellectae est in intellectu universaliter, et immaterialiter, et immobiliter; quod ex ipsa operatione intellectus
apparet, qui intelligit universaliter, at per modum
necessitatis cujusdam. Modus enim actionis est secundum modum formae agentis. ~t ideo existimavit quod
oporteret res intellectas hoc modo in seipsis subsistere,
scilicet. immaterialiter et immobiliter. Hoc autem necessarium non est; quia etiam in ipsis sensibilibus videmus,
quod forma alio modo est in uno sensibilium quam in altero;
puta cum in uno est albedo intensior, in alio remissior; et
cum in uno est albedo cum dulcedine, in alio sine dulcedine.
Et per hunc etiam modum forma sensibilia alio modo est in
re, quae est extra animam, et alio modo in sensu, qui suscipit formas sensibilium absque materia, sicut colorem
auri sine auro. Et similiter intellectus species corporum,
quae sunt materiales et mobiles, recipit immaterialiter et
immobiliter secundum modum suum; nam receptum est in recipiente per modum recipientis.
Dicendum est ergo quod anima per intellectum cog-
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noscit corpora cognitione immateriali, universali et
necessaria.
~.Theel., I.q.84.a.l.c.
In maintining; that the soul knows material things through the intellect
and not through its own essence, St. Thomas is opposing the crude application

of the maxim:

Like is known by like, as it is found in Empedocles.

Em-

pedocles and the early philosophers taught that, as like is known by like,
the soul, in order to know all material things, had to have the same nature
common to all.

Therefore, they taught that the soul is composed of the four

elements and that it knows fire because it has fire in its make-up, earth
because of earth and so on.

All the soul's

kn~rledge

would thus be material

and there would be no distinction between sense and intellect.
st. Thomas points out that if the assertion, like is know.n by like, be
taken in this· sense, and the soul knows fire because of the fire in its own
make-up it follows that fire outside the soul should know fire, which is
ridiculous.

Moreover, it is not the matter, but the form, which makes a

particular thing to be what it is.

It would then be necessary that not the

matter only, but also the form of each individual thing; be in the soul.

Thus

the soul would have to be not only earth, fire, etc., but also bones, flesh,
and all things.

This cannot be admitted.

These early philosophers failed

to distinguish between the material and the immaterial and between sense
knowledge and intellectual knowledge.

In the doctrine of St. Thomas materi-

ality and intellectuality are in inverse ratio.

Thus things which are

wholly material, immersed, as it were, in matter and entirely compassed by
it, are incapable of receiving; any form but their own.

A stone is a stone

,,

33

and nothing more.

\Vhile remaining a stone, it has no potentiality with

regard to other forms and consequently can have no knowledge.

Beings which

are provided with senses are capable of receiving forms other than their own
while they retain their own form, and consequently have sense knowledge.
But because the senses

operat~

through corporeal organs the objects of sense

knowledge are necessarily limited.

Vision is exercised through an organ,

the eye; and the eye is capable of receiving only the for.m of color.

More-

over, the senses receive forms materially, and not just subject to material
conditions.

The intellect on the other hand, is immaterial and because it

does not operate through a material organ, it is not subject to the limitationsthat affect the senses and consequently is capable of receiving the
forms of all things.
written.

It is a capacity, a blank sheet on which anything is

It is not limited by matter and receives the forms of things im-

materially, although subject to material conditions.

st. Thomas agrees with

the early philosophers that for the intellect to knav1 all things through its
essence it would be necessary that all things be in its essence actually.
He disagrees with their application of the doctrine.
does not actually contain the forms of all things.

The intellectual soul
It is potentially all

things in as much as it is capable of receiving the forms of all sensible
things in virtue of the sense and of intelligible things in virtue of the
intellect.

It is proper to God alone that His Essence should comprise all

things immaterially and He alone, therefore, understands all things through
His Essence.
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Relinquitur ergo quod oportet materialia cognita in
cognoscente existere, non materialiter, sed magis
immaterialiter. Et hujus ratio est, quia actus cognitionis se extendit ad ea quae sunt extra cognoscentem. Cognosc~us enim etiam ea quae extra nos sunt.
Per materiam autem determinatur forma rei ad aliquid
unum. Unde manifestum est quod ratio cognitionis ex
opposito sed habet ad rationemmaterialitis. Et ideo
quae non recipiunt formas nisi materialiter, nullo modo
sunt cognoscitiva, sicut plantae. • .Quanta autem aliquid
immaterialius habet formam rei cognitae, tanto perfectus
cognoscit. Unde et intellectus, qui abstrahit speciam
non solum a materia, sed etiam a materialibus conditionibus individuantibus, perfectius cognoscit quam sensus,
qui accipit formam rei cognitae sine materia quidem, sed
cum materialibus conditionibus. Et inter ipsos sensus
visus est magis cognoscitivus, quia est minus materialis • • •
Et inter ipsos intellectus tanto quilibet est perfectior,
quanta immaterialior.
Ex his ergo patet quod si aliquis intellectus est
qui per essentiam suam cognoscit omnia, oportet quod
essentia ejus habeat in se immaterialiter omnia; sicut
antiqui posuerunt essentiam animae actu componi ex principiis omnium materialium, ut cognosceret omnia. Hoc
autem est proprium Dei, ut ejus Essentia sit immaterialiter comprehensiva omnium, prout effectus virtute praeexistunt in causa. Salus igitur Deus per essentiam suam
omnia intelligit; non autem anima humana, neque etiam
angelus.
~.Theol~, I.q.84.a.2.c.
The immaterial presence of the corporeal thing in the intellect is what
St. Thomas calls the species.
species?

Is it innate?

The question then arises, Vfuence is this

If not, in what manner does the soul acquire it?

St. Thomas rejects the doctrine that the soul knows through innate
species.

Just as the senses gather knowledge through sensible things, and

the imagination receives its material from the senses, so the intellect gets
its knowledge through the phantasm.

This phantasm is not innate but is sup-
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plied by means of the corporeal organs •
• • • videtur esse tota philosophorum doctrina, quae
sensus a sensibilibus, imaginationem a sensu, intellectum a phantasmatibus accipere fatetur.
Quodl., 8.q.2.a.3.c.
The objection has been raised that, since men and angels have understanding in common, the intellectual soul, like the separate substances
should understand through innate species.

st. Thomas answers, saying that

while men and angels have understanding in common, men have not the same
perfection of intelligence as the angels, just as lower grades of bodies,
which merely exist, have not the same degree of perfection as higher bodies.
Or again, just as a weaker eye is blinded by intense light in which a
stronger eye sees clearly, so the intellectual soul would be blinded, as it
were, by species proper to a higher intelligence.
Plato held that man's intellect is filled with intelligible species,
and that, man has forgotten his natural knowledge of all things because of
his union with the body.

St. Thomas refuses to accept such a doctrine on

the grounds that, first, things naturally known are not forgotten, and
secondly, that those deprived of the use of a sense are found to be without
knowledge of the things that sense could perceive.
idea of color.

The blind man has no

This would not be true if man had an innate idea of all

things.
• •• sed hoc non videtur convenienter dictum, primo
quidem quia si habet anima naturalem notitiam omnium,
non videtur esse possibile quod hujus naturalis notitiae tantam oblivionem capiat, quod nesciat se hujusmodi soientiam habere. Nullus enim homo obliviscitur
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ea quae naturaliter cognoscit, sicut quod omne totum
sit majus sua parte, et alia hujusmodi. Praecipus
autem hoc videtur esse inconveniens, si ponatur esse
animae naturale corpori uniri, • • • Inconveniens enim
est quod naturalis operatio alicujus rei totaliter
impediatur per id quod est sibi secundum naturam.
Secundo manifeste apparet hujus positionis falsitas
ex hoc quod deficiente aliquo sensu, deficit soientia
eorum quae apprehenduntur secundum illum sensum; sicut
caecus natus nullam potest habere notitiam de coloribus;
quod non asset, si intellectui animae essent naturaliter
inditae omnium intelligibilium rationes. Et ideo dicendum est quod anima non cognoscit corporalia per species
naturaliter inditas.
~.Theol., I.q.84.a.3.c.
Plato held that the forms of material things subsisted by themselves
without matter, and are participated in both by our intellect, with the result that the intellect has knowledge of the thing participated in; and by
corporeal matter to the effect of existence.

According to St. Thomas' in-

terpretation, Plato likewise held that these participated ideas remain immovably in the soul, and it is these separate ideas, not sensible things,
that cause our knowledge.

The sensible objects merely rouse the soul to

consider what it had knowledge of from the beginning.

This doctrine makes

learning to be a kind of remembering or recalling •
• • • posuit Plato enim quod sensibilia non sunt disponentia animam ad recipiendum influentiam formarum,
sed solum expergesoentia intellectum ad considerandum
ea quorum scientiam habebat ab exteriori causatam.
Ponebat enim quod a principio a formis separatis causabatur scientia in animabus nostris omnium scibilium;
unde addiscere dixit esse quoddam reminisci. • •
~.Cont.Gent., II.74.
Plato, in trying to avoid the error that certitude is impossible, deVeloped a doctrine in which it is impossible to account for the union of soul
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and body.

If the soul knows by innate species, it has no need of turning to

the phantasm, and consequently has no need of union with the body.

St.

Thomas rejects the doctrine on this very point, for it goes back to the idea
that the union of soul and body is not for the good of the soul, but for the
good of the body alone; form, that is, exists for the sake of matter.
Unusquisque bene judicat quae cognoscit, et horum
est optimus judex. • .Sed • • • per mentem ista
inferiora judicantur. Ergo haec inferiora materialia per mentem intelliguntur.
Per sensum non cognoscimus nisi materialia. Sed
cognitio mentis a sensu oritur. Ergo at mens naturales
res cognoscit.
~I.!:!:._·, q.lO.a.4.c.
st. Thomas opposes any theory of innate ideas in the following passage:
Sed secundum hanc positionem sufficiens ratio
assignari non posset, quare anima nostra corpori
uniretur. Non enim potest dici, quod anima intellectiva corpori uniatur propter corpus; quia nee
forma est propter materirun, nee motor propter
mobile, sed potius e converso. Maxima autem
videtur corpus esse necessarium animae intellectivae ad ejus propriam operationem, quae est intelligere; quia secundum esse suum a corpore non dependet • • • Si autem dicatur, quod indiget anima
nostra sensibus ad intelligendum, quibus quodam
modo excitetur ad consideranda ea quorum species
intelligibiles a principiis separatus recipit, hoc
non videtur sufficere; quia hujusmodi excitatio non
videtur necessaria animae, nisi in quantum est consopita (secundum Platonicos) quodammodo, et ob~
liviosa propter unionem ad corpus; ·et sic sensus non
proficerent animae intellectivae, nisi ad tollendum
impedimentum quod animae provenit ex corporis unione.
Sum.Theol., I.q.S4.a.4.c.
He concludes:
Unde dicendum est, quod species intelligibiles, quibus

38

anima nostra intelligit, non effluunt a formis separatis.
~.Theol., I.q.84.a.4.c.
st. Augustine, who was imbued with Platonic doctrines, took up this
point of Plato's teaching, namely that the intelligible species by which our
soul understands are derived from separate forms.
doctrine that the forms of things exist per

~,

He did not accept Plato's

in a world apart.

He sub-

stituted, as St. Thomas points out, the eternal types of all things existing in the Divine mind.
Sunt namque ideae principales formae quaedam, vel
rationes rerum ste_biles atque incoi!liilutabiles, quae
ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quae in divina intelligentia continentur. Et cum ipsae neque oriantur,
neque intereant; secundum eas tamen formari dicitur
omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod
oritur et interit. Anima vero negatur eas intueri
posse, nisi rationalis, ea sui parte qua excellit,
idest ipsa mente atque ratione, quasi quadam facie
vel oculo suo interiore atque intelligibili. Et ea
quidem ipsa rationalis anima non omnis et quaelibet,
sed quae sancta et pura fuerit, haec asseritur illi
~~s~oni esse ~aonea:
id est, quae illum ipsum
oculum quo ~dentur ista, sanum, et sincerum, et
serenum, et similem his rebus quas videre intendit,
habuerit. Quis autem religiosus et vera religione
imbutus, quamvis nondum possit haec intueri, negare
tamen audeat, imo non etiam profiteatur, omnia quae
sunt, id est, quaecumque in suo genere propria quadam
natura continentur, ut sint, ~Deo auctore esse procreata, eoque auctore omnia quae vivunt vivere, atque
universalem rerum incolumitatem, ordinemque ipsum
quo ea quae mutantur, suos temporales cursus certo
moderamine celebrant, sUI!liili Dei legibus contineri et
gubernari? Quo constitute atque concesso, quis
audeat dicere Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse?
Quod si, recte dici vel credi non potest, restat ut
omnia ratione sint condita. Nee eadem ratione homo,
qua equus: hoc enim absurdum est existimare. Singula igitur propriis sunt creata rationibus. Has autem
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rationes ubi arbitrandum est esse, nlsl ln ipsa mente
Creatoris? Non enim extra se quidquam positum intuebatur,
ut secundum id constitueret quod constituebat: nam hoc
opinari sacrilegum est. Quod si hae rerum omnium
creandarum creatarumve rationes in divina mente continentur, neque in divina mente quidquaw. nisi aeternum atque
incommutabile potest esse; atque has rerum rationes principales appellat ideas Plato: non solum sunt ideae, sed
ipsae verae sunt, quia aeternae .sunt, et ejusmodi atque
incommutabiles manent; quarum participations fit ut sit
quidquid est, quoquomodo est • • •
De Diversis Quaestionibus, q.83.46.
Thus, while Plato held that wAtter becomes a stone by participating in
the idea stone, and by participating in the same idea our intellect has
knowledge of a stone, st. Augustine held that all things are made in accordance with the eternal types existing in the mind of God, and the intellectual
soul knows these things in the types.

st. Thomas accepts the doctrine of

st. Augustine, but he states clearly that it is not at all the same as
Plato's theory.

Plato apparently held that mere participation in the idea

resulted in knO¥rledge, but St. Thomas holds that not only the intellectual
light within us but.intelligible species derived from things themselves are
required in order that we may have knowledge of material things.

Just as

in the physical order there must not only be light but there must also be.
colored objects for the eye to see, so too in the intellectual order there
must be intelligible species.
The intellect knows material things, but there are two
one thing is said to be known in another.
an object which is itself known.

~~ys

in which

Firstly, a thing may be known in

Thus in looking in a mirror one sees

images of things reflected therein.

The things are known through the mirror.

l
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In its present life the soul cannot know all things in the eternal types
according to this mode.

The reason is that in this life the soul does not

see God in 11\fu.om the eternal types are.

Secondly, one thing may be said to

be known in another as in a principle of knowledge.

In this sense one might

say that we see in the sun what we see by the light of the sun.

It is in

this sense that the human soul knows all things in the eternal types.

The

intellectual light in us is a participated likeness of that uncreated light
which contains the. eternal types.

By our participated likeness in the

Divine light all things are made known to us, but this intellectual light is
not sufficient that we may know material things.

There must also be the

intelligible species derived from the things themsel vas.

1J'Jere the intellec-

tual light alone sufficient for a knowledge of material things man could
know, without research and investigation, the natures of material things,
their origin and development.

Such is not the case.

Therefore, although

man knows material things in the eterne.l types, he does not know them without

the intelligible species abstracted from the things themselves •
• • • dicendum est quod aliquid in aliquo dicitur cognosci
dupliciter. Uno modo sicut in objecto cognito, sicut
aliquis videt in specula ea quorum imagines in specula
resultant; et hoc modo anima in statu praesentis vitae
non potest videre omnia in rationibus aeternis; sed sio
in rationibus aeternis cognoscunt omnia beati, qui Deum
vident, et omnia in ipso.
Alio modo dicitur aliquid cognosci in aliquo sicut
in cognitionis principia; sicut si dicamus quod in sole
videntur ea quae videntur per solem; et sic necesse est
dicere quod anima humana omnia cognoscat in rationibus
aeternis, per quarum participationem omnia cognoscimus.
Ipsum enim lumen intellectuale, quod est in nobis, nihil
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est aliud quam quaedam partioipata similitude luminis
inoreati, in quo oontinentur rationes aeternae.
Sum.Theol., I.q.84.a.5.c.
Since the intelligible species are required that we might have knowledge of material things, the question arises whether intellectual knowledge,
too, is derived from sensible things.

St. Thomas takes a middle course be-

tween the doctrine that all knowledge is caused by

impressio~s

made on the

senses by sensible objects, and that which maintains that the intellect is
in no way dependent on the senses or sensible things for its knowledge, but
receives its knowledge solely from separate intelligible forms or ideas.
Democritus, failing to distinguish between sense and intellect, held
that all knowledge is effected by the impression made on the senses by sensible things, that is, by a discharge of images.
Democritus enim posuit quod nulla est alia causa cujuslibet nostrae cognitionis, nisi cum ab his corporibus
quae cogitamus, veniunt, atque intrant imagines in
animas nostras, • • • Democritus posuit cognitionem
fieri per idola et defluxiones • • .quia tam ipse
Democritus • • • non ponebat intellectum differe a
sensu. • •
~.Theel., I.q.84.a.6.c.
This leaves no place for intellectual knowledge and cannot be accepted.
Although it is true that our knowledge originates in the senses yet it can
go far beyond mere sense knowledge •
• • • scientia nostra a sensu oritur.
De~··

i

l

l

q.lO.a.6.c.

Moreover, the immaterial could not affect the senses by a discharge of images
yet knowledge of the immaterial is proper to man.

Therefore, were Democritus'

42

opinion correct, natura would have failed to provide man with means of acquiring the knowledge proper to him.

This cannot be accepted.

Natura nihil • • • deficit in necessariis.
DeVer., q.lO.a.s.
Plato held that the intellect is not dependent on the senses nor on
sensible things, but rather, that it receives its knowledge from separate
intelligible forms, or ideas.

st. Thomas interprets him as holding that,

not the sense, but only the sensible organs were affected by the sensible.
According to Plato neither intellectual nor sensible knowledge proceed exelusively from sensible things.

The sensible things merely rouse the sensi-

ble soul to the sentient act, and the senses rouse the intellect to the act
of understanding, without in any way causing the intellectual act.

Thus the

sensibles merely cause the soul to recollect, as it were, knowledge which it
possessed previously, and which had been dulled or forgotten because of the
union with the body.

st. Thomas rejects this doctrine likewise because it

makes the union of soul and body to be at least useless, and nature does
nothing in vain.
Natura nihil facit frustra • • •
DeVer., q.lo.a.6.
St. Thomas gives Plato's doctrine as follows:
Plato • • • posuit intellectum differre a sensu, at
intellectum quidem esse virtutem immaterialem organo
corporeo non utentem in suo actu. Et quia incorporeum
non potest immutari a corporeo, posuit quod cognitio
intellectualis non fit per immutationam intellectus a
sensibilibus, sed par participationem formarum intelligibilium separatarum, • • .Sensum etiam posuit virtutem quamdam per se operantem. Unde nee ipse sensus,
cum sit quaedam vis spiritualis, immutatur a sansibili-
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bus; sed organa sensuum a sensibilibus immutantur;
ex qua immutatione anima quodammodo excitatur, ut in
se species sensibilium format • • • Sic igitur secundum
Platonis opinionem neque intellectualis cognitio a
sensibili procedit, neque etiam sensibilia totaliter,
a sensibilibus rebus; sed sensibilia excitant animam
sensibilem ad sentiendum, et similiter sensus excitant
animam intellectivam ad intelligendum.
Sum.Theol., I.q.84.a.6.c.
Accepting in part both the doctrine of Democritus and Plato, St. Thomas
agrees that the impression of the sensible on the sense causes the act of
the sensitive part, not by a discharge from the sensible but by an operation
of some sort.

He agrees with Plato that the impression produced by the

sensible does not suffice to cause the intellectual operation, something
nobler being required.

But St. Thomas does not accept Plato's doctrine that

the intellectual operation is caused merely by participation in the ideas.
For st. Thomas the nobler thing required is the acting intellect which makes
the phantasm of the sensible thing intelligible in act by abstraction of
the intelligible species.

Intellectual knowledge is then caused partly by

the senses, for it is through the senses that the phantasms are provided,
and these are the material vnth which the intellect works.

However, intel-

lectual knowledge is not caused wholly by sensitive knowledge and can far
surpass sensible knowledge.

Thus:

Secundum hoc ergo ex parte phantasmatum intellectualis
operatic a sensu causatur. Sed quia phantasmata non
sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed oportet
quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem;
non potest dici quod sensibilia cognitio sittotalis et
perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis
quodam modo est materia causae.
~.Theol., I.q.84.a.6.c.
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And again:
• • • scientiam mentis nostrae partem ab intrinseco esse,
partem ab extrinseco, non solum a rebus a materia separatis, sed etiam ab ipsis sensibilibus.
De~·· q.lO.a.6.c.
Since intellectual knowledge can surpass sensitive knowledge it might
seem that the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible
species without turning to the phantasms.

St. Thomas holds, however, that

there are two indications that the intellect, in order to understand actually, must turn to the phantasm.

First, the intellect does not operate through

a corporeal organ and therefore it would not be impeded or hindered in its
act by the lesion of sorre bodily organ unless this act implies the operation
of some power that does require a corporeal organ for its operation.

In

the case of lethargy a man is no longer able to understand things of which
he formerly had knowledge.

Memory requires the act of a corporeal organ,

and the intellectual act obviously requires the memory since it is impeded
in its operation when the memory fails.

Now the phantasms of things known

formerly are stored in the memory, so it follows that the intellect must
turn to the phantasms in order to understand.

Secondly, in attempting to

understand something one makes use of examples from which he forms phantasms
and thus examines, in a manner, the thing he desires to understand.

More-

over, in order to understand incorporeal things of which there are no phantasms, one compares them with sensible things from which phantasms can be
formed.

The reason for this is that the proper object of the human intel-

lect, which i9 united to the body, is a nature existing in individual, cor-
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poreal matter, as, for example, this stone or this horse.
0

Now the intellect

annot directly apprehend the individual as such; this is done through the

senses and imagination.

Therefore the intellect must turn to the material

representation of the individual, that is, to the phantasm, in order to peroeive the universal nature, stone or horse, existing in the individual.
Plato, on the other hand, considered the proper object of the human intellect
to be the natures of sensible things existing apart from material conditions.
In his doctrine there was no need of the phantasm.
• • .impossibile est intellectum nostrum secundum praesentis vitae statum quo passibili corpori conjungitur,
aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad
phantasmata • • • Hujus autem re.tio est quia potentia
cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili. Unde intellectus Angeli, qui est totaliter a corpore separatus,
objectum proprium est substantia intelligibilis a corpore separata; et per hujusmodi intelligibile materialia cognoscit. Intellectus autem humani, qui est
conjunctus corpori, proprium objectum est quidditas
sive natura in materia corpori existens; et per rerum
aliqualem cognitionem ascendit. De ratione autem hujus
naturae est quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non
est absque materia corporali; sicut de ratione naturae
lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide, et de ratione
naturae equi est quod sit in hoc equo, et sic de aliis.
Unde natura lapidis, vel cujuscumque materialis rei,
cognosci non potest complete et vera, nisi secundum
quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. Particulars autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem;
et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum objectum proprium, quod convertat se ad
phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalem in
particulari existentem. Si autem proprium objectu,
intellectus nostri esset forma separata, vel si formae
rerum sensibilium subsisterent non in particularibus,
secundum Platonicos, non oporteret quod intellectus
noster semper intelligendo converteret se ad phantasmata.
~.Theol., I.q.84.a.7.c.
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Since the intellect must turn to the phantasm in order to understand, a
suspension of the sensitive powers would hinder the judgment of the intellect.

To understand this it is only necessary to recall that the proper ob-

ject of the intellect is the nature of a sensible thing, as stone or horse,
and in its present state vmatever the intellect understands it knows by comparison to sensible things, as was said.

The intellect itself cannot direct-

ly apprehend the individual, sensible thing.

It knows sensible things

through the senses which do directly apprehend the material thing.

Con-

sequently when the senses are suspended the intellect cannot know the nature
of things and for this reason cannot form a perfect judgment of them.

This

is because the source of knowledge is out off from the intellect and not
because the act of judgment is exercised through a corporeal organ •
• • • judicium intelleotus non dependet a sensu hoc modo,
quod actus iste intellectus per organum sensibile exerceatur • • •
De~-, q.l2.a.3.ad 3um.
Thus:
Uanifestum est autem quod non posset esse perfectum
judicium fabri de cultello, si opus ignorare.t; et
similiter non posset esse perfectum judicium scientiae naturalis de rebus naturalibus, si sensibilia
ignorarentur. Omnia autem quae in praesenti statu
intelligimus, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem
ad res sensibiles naturales. Unde impossibile est
quod sit in nobis judicium intellectus perfectum cum
ligamenta sensus, per quem res sensibiles cognoscimus.
~.Theol., I.q.34.a.s.c.
Since the phantasm is necessary in order that the intellect in its
present state may acquire knowledge, the question arises, in what manner does
the intellect make use of the phantasm?

Does the intellect understand by
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abstracting the intelligible species from the phantasm?
traction the work of the acting intellect?
~at

If so, is this abs-

Again, is the species abstracted

the intellect understands or that whereby it understands?
For st. Thomas, intelligibility is in inverse ratio to materiality.

only in so far as a thing can be abstracted from matter and material representations or images can it be understood.
• • .'sicut res sunt separabiles ~ materia, sic circa
Ergo oportet quod materialia intelligantur inquantum a materia abstrahuntur et a
similitudinibus materialibus quae sunt phantasmata.
~.Theel., I.q.85.a.l.c.
intellectum-sun~

Because the phantasm is a material representation of an object it cannot
make an impression on the possible intellect, which is immaterial, and therefore it cannot be understood by the intellect.

It is only when the acting

intellect throws light on the phantasm and abstracts from it the intelligible
species, free from conditions of materiality and individuality, that the
possible intellect is informed or understands.

The intellect can be informed

only by an immaterial representation of an object, that is, by a form abstracted from the phantasm representing an individual material thing.

The

reason for this is that the soul is united to a body and therefore has as its
proper object a nature·existing in corporeal matter, and yet, because the
intellect is immaterial and "like is known by like" the intellect can be impressed or informed only by the immaterial.

Therefore it is necessary that

the proper object of the intellect be represented in an immaterial manner.
The senses apprehend directly the material things and by means of the senses
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the phantasm is produced.

Thus the intellect understands a thing otherwise

than it is, in the sense that the form of the thing known is present imrnateri
ally in the intellect, While that same form is present materially in the
thing known.

However, since the intellect understands the thing known as it

is in itself this mode of understanding implies no falsehood, as st. Thomas
shows.

He distinguishes between the two ways in which abstraction may

occur, first, by composition or division; and second, by simple and absolute
abstraction.

According to the first mode we may understand that one thing

does not exist in some other, or that it is separate from it.

For the in-

tellect to abstract from one another things that are not really abstract
from one another would imply falsehood.

Thus to consider a triangle without

three angles or to say that color does not exist in a colored object would
be false.

According to the second mode however the intellect may abstract

things which are not really abstract from one another, without falsehood.
Thus it is possible to consider color apart from a colored glass, since
glass is not essential to color.

Those things which belong to the species

of a thing can be thought of apart from individualizing principles which do
not belong to the notion of the species.

One can, for example, consider man

apart from the tall, white man, since tallness and whiteness do not belong
to the notion of the species man.

It is according to this second mode that

the intelligible species is abstracted from the phantasm.

The nature of the

species, that is, is considered apart from those individual qualities represented by the phantasm.

In speaking of the object of our knowledge and the

intellect's mode of understanding St. Thomas says:
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• • • Intellectus • • • humanus • • • non est actus alicujus organi, sed taman est quaedam virtus animae, quae
est forma corporis • • • Et ideo proprium ejus est cognoscere formam in materia quidem corporali individualiter
existentem, non tamen prout est tali materia. Cognoscere
vera id quod est in materia individuali, non prout est in
tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia individuali,
quam repraesentant phantasmata. ~ ideo nocesse est
dicere quod intellectus noster intelligit materialia
abstrahendo a phantasmatibus; et per materialia sic considerata in immaterialium aliqualem cognitionem devenimus. • •
~.Theol., I.q.85.a.l.c.
And,

• • • abstrahere contingit dupliciter: uno modo per modum
compositionis et divisionis, sicut cum intelligimus aliquid non esse in alia, vel esse separatum ad eo. Alia
modo per modum simplicitatis; sicut cum intelligimus
unum, nihil considerando de alia. Abstrahere igitur per
intellectum ea quae secundum rem non sunt abstracta,
secundum primum modum abstrahendi, non est absque falsitate. Sed secunda modo abstrahere per intellectum quae
non sunt abstracta secundum rem, non habet falsitatem,
ut in sensibus manifesto apparet • • • est enim absque
falsitate ut alius sit modus intelligentis in intelligendo,
quammodus rei in essendo; quia intellectum est in intelligente immaterialiter per modum intellectus, non
autem materialiter per modum rei materialis.
~.Theel., I.q.85.a.l. ad lum.
The intelligible species

a~stracted

from the phantasm is that whereby the in-

tellect understands rather than what it understands.

It is through these

species that the intellect is able to understand objects outside the soul.
The intelligible species are
to the senses.
ceive an object.
is

~o

the intellect what the sensible species are

Now the sensible species are that whereby the senses perThe sight sees by a likeness of the visible thing, yet it

not the likeness, but the exterior thing itself which is seen.

So too

the intelligible species are that whereby the intellect understands, rather
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than that which is understood.

Were these species that which and not rather

that whereby the intellect understands there could be no science.

This is

because science is concerned with things outside the soul, and the intellect
must be able actually to know these external things and not merely the intelligible species which exist only in the soul.
Moreover a faculty can judge only of what it kncrv•s.
its ovm impression as such, it can judge only of that.

If it knows only
Consequently if

sight perceived only its own impression, one whose vision is faulty might
perceive red to be brown, while one with good vision would perceive red as
red.

Since each judges according to what he perceives both opinions would

be true.

The same would hold for the intellect.

It must be concluded that

the sensible species is that whereby the sense perceives an exterior object
and the intelligible species

tl~t

whereby the intellect understands.

• • • phantasmata se habent ad intellectum nostrum sicut
sensibilia ad sensum, ut colores, qui sunt extra animrum,
ad visum; unde sicut species, quae est in sensu, abstrahitur a rebus ipsis, et per eam cognitio sensus continuatur
ad ipsas res sensibiles; ita intellectus noster abstrahit
speciem a phantasmatibus, et per eam cognitio eius quodammodo ad phantasmata continuatur. Sed tamen tantum interest
quod similitude quae est in sensu, abstrahitur a re ut ab
obieoto cognosoibili, et ideo res ipsa per illam similitudinem recte oognoscitur: similitude autem quae est in intellectu, non abstrahitur a phantasmate sicut ab obiecto
cognoscibili, sed sicut a medio cognitionis, per modum quo
sensus noster accipit siwilitudinem rei quae est in
speculo, dum fertur in eam non ut in rem quamdam, sed ut
in similitudinem. Unde intellectus noster non directe ex
specie quam suscipit, fertur ad cognoscendum phantasma,
sed ad cognoscendum rem cujus est phantasma; sed taman
per quandam reflexionem redit etiam in cognitionem ipsius
phantasmatis, dum oonfiderat naturam actus sui, et speciei
per quam intuetur, et eius a quo speciem abstrahit, scilicet phantasmatis; sicut per similitudinem quae est in visu
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a specula accepta, directe fertur visus in cognitionem
rei speculatae; sed per quamdum reversionem fertur per
eamdem in ipsam similitudinem quae est in specula. Inquantum ergo intellectus noster per similitudinem quam
accepit a phantaamate, reflectitur in ipsum phantasmata,
a quo speciem abstrahit, quod est similitude particularis,
habet quamdam cognitionem de singulari secundum continuationem quarodam intellectus ad imaginationem.
De Ver. q.2.a.6.c.
The object represented by the intelligible species is understood primarily,
somewhat as a person looking into a mirror sees himself primarily and the
mirror reflecting the image only secondarily.
itself understood but only secondarily.

The intelligible species is

This is because a man is able to

reflect upon himself and not only does he understand but can, as it were,
see himself in the act of understanding and see also that 'whereby he understands.

By its act the intellect understands exterior things, the intelli-

gible species serving as the matter with which the intellect works.
action may be of two kinds:

Now

one of which remains in the agent, as to hear

or to knmv; the other passes fram the agent into an external object, as to
heat or to saw.

Every action proceeds from some form, and whether the act

remain in the agent or passes from the agent into an external object, the
form from which the act proceeds resembles the object.

Thus heat passes

into another and the heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated.
So too, sight sees by the likeness of the visible thing, and the intellect is
informed by the likeness of the thing understood, that is, by the intelligible species.

It thus knows things by means of the intelligible species.

Et ideo dicendum est quod species intelligibiles se
habet ad intellectum ut quo intelligit intellectus:
quod sit patet. Cum enim sit duplex actio, • • • una
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quae manet in agente (ut videre et intelligere), et
altera quae transit in rem exteriorem (ut calefacere
et secare); utraque fit secundum aliquam formrum. Et
sicut forma secundum qu~ provenit actio tendens in
rem exteriorem, est similitude objecti actionis (ut
calor calefacientis est similitude calefacti), similiter forma secundum quam provenit actio manens in
agente, est similitude objecti. Unde similitude rei
visibilis est secundum qu~ visus videt; et similitude
rei intellectae, quae est species intelligibilis, est
forma secundum quam intellectus intelligit. Sed quia
intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundum eamdem reflexionem intelligit et suum intelligere, et
speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellecta
secundario est id quod intelligitur; sed id quod intelligitur primo, est res, cujus species intelligibilis
est similitude • • •
~.Theol., I.q.85.a.2.c.
Because the phantasm is necessary for the intellectual act in the soul's
present state of union with the body, intellectual knowledge is in a way
dependent on, since it arises from, sensible knowledge.

Now with regard to

both time and space sensible knowledge of the more common precedes knowledge
of the less common.

Thus a sound heard afar off is first perceived to be a

noise, and as one approaches, to be a voice, then the voice of a man, until
finally the words uttered are distinguished.

Likewise, a child can dis-

tinguish man from not-man before he is able to distinguish this man from that

man.

Sensible knowledge proceeds from less to more perfect knowledge, and

this indistinct knowledge is a state between mere potentiality for knowledge
and complete knowledge.

This same holds for intellectual knowledge as well

as for sense knowledge.

Thus the knowledge of the universal is first in our

intellectual cognition.

The reason for this is that the intellect proceeds

from potentiality to actuality, from an incomplete act to a perfect one.
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The incomplete act is indistinct, confused knowledge of a thing, while the
perfect act is distinct, determinate knowledge of the object.

Confused know-

ledge is knowledge of an object without knowledge of the parts contained in
the object.

To know these parts also, is to know the less common and consti-

tutes distinct knowledge.

To know animal only as animal is to know it in-

distinctly; whereas to know rational or irrational animal, man or horse, is
to know animal distinctly.

It is thus the intellect knows the universal,

or more common, before the singular and particular •
• • • in cognitione nostri intellectus duo oportet considerare. Primo quidem, quod cognitio intellectiva
aliquo modo a sensitiva primordium sumit. Et quia
sensus est singularium, intellectus autem universalium;
necesse est quod cognitio singularium quoad nos prior
sit quam universalium cognitio. Secundo oportet considerare quod intellectus noster de potentia in actum
procedit. Omne autam quod procedit de potentia in
actum, prius pervenit ad actum incompletum, qui est
medius inter potentiam et actum, quam ad actum perrectum. Actus autem perfectus ad quem pervenit intellectus, est scientia completa, per quam distincte
et determinate res cognoscuntur; actus autem incompletus est scientia imperfecta, per quam sciuntur
res indistincte sub quadam confusione • • • sensus exit
de potentia in actum, sicut intellectus; idem etiam
ordo cognitionis apparet in sensu. Nam prius secundum
sensmn dijudicamus magis commune quam minus commune,
et secundum locum et secundum tempus: secundum locum
quidem, sicut cum aliquid videtur a remotis, prius
deprehenditur esse corpus quam deprehendatur esse
animal; et prius deprehenditur esse animal quam deprehendatur esse homo, et prius homo quam Socrates vel
Plato; secundum tempus autem, quia puer a principia
prius distinguit hominem a non homine, quam distinguat
hunc hominem ab alio homine; et ideo pueri a principio
appellant omnes viros patres, posterius autem determinant unumquemqua • • • Et hujus ratio manifesta est, qu~a
qui scit aliquid indistincte, adhuc est in potentia ut
sciat distinctionis principium, sicut qui scit genus,
est in potentia ut sciat differentiam. Et sic patet
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quod cognitio indistincta madia est inter potentiam
et actum.
Est ergo dicendum quod cognitio singularium est
prior quoad nos quam cognitio universalium, sicut
cognitio sensitiva, qu~ cognitio intellectiva. Sed
tam secundum sensum quam secundum intellectum cognitio magis communis est prior quam cognitio minus
communis.
~.Theol., I.q.85.a.3.c.
The human intellect, unlike the angelic or Divine intelligence, acquires
knowledge by composition and division of the parts of the object known, proceeding from less to more perfect knowledge.

The angelic and Divine intel-

lect have their perfection at once, and consequently have entire

kn~vledge

a thing at once, by simply understanding the essence of the thing.

of

The human

intellect, resembling things which are generated and corruptible, passes from
potentiality to actuality.

Now intellectual knowledge originates in the

senses, which perceive the accidents of a thing.

The proper object of the

intellect however is not the accidents, but the essence or quiddity, the
substance of a thing.
Proprium • • • obiectum intellectus est quod quid est,
idest substantia rei • • • Igitur quicquid intellectus de
aliqua re cognoscit, cognoscit per cognitionem substantiae illius rei: unde in qualibet demonstratione
per quam innotescunt nobis propria accidentia, principium accipimus quod quid est • • • Si autam substantiam
alicuius rei intellectus cognoscat per accidentia, • • •
quod accidentia magnam partem conferunt ·ad cognoscendum
quod quid est; hoc est per accidens, inquantum cognitio
intellectus oritur a sensu, et sic per sensibilium accidentium cognitionem oportet ad substantiae intellectum
pervenire • • •
~.Cont.~. III, 46.
The intelligible species by which the intellect understands represents the
object stripped of all its accidents and properties.

The mental process of
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separating the nature of the thing from its accidents necessarily implies
differentiating and comparing.

The human intellect first understands some-

thing about its object, as its nature, and later the properties and

accide~

proceeding thus from one composition and division to another, reasoning
until it arrives at complete knowledge.
• • • cum enim intellectus humanus exeat de potentia
in actum, similitudinem quamdam habet cum rebus
generabilibus, quae non statim perfectionem suam habent,
sed earn successive acquirunt. Et similiter intellectus
humanus non statim in prima apprehensions capit perfectam rei cognitionem; sed primo apprehendit aliquid
de ipsa, puta quidditatem ipsius rei, quae est primum et
proprium objectum intellectus; et deinde intelligit
proprietates et accidentia, et habitudines circumBtantes
rei essentiam. Et secundum hoc necesse habet unum apprehensum alii componere, et dividere, et ex una compositione et divisione ad aliam procedere; quod est ratiocinari.
Sum.Theol., I.q.85.a.5.c.
The object of the intellect is the quiddity of a natural thing.
all natural things are composed of matter and form.

Now

The matter is the

principle of individualization, but matter is repugnant to intelligibility,
as was said.

It seems evident then that the intellect knows the universal

directly but that it cannot know the singular directly.
• • • intellectus noster nunc cognoscit per species a
rebus acceptas, quae sunt abstrahactae a materia, et
omnibus materiae conditionibus; et ideo non potest cognosc~ro singularia, quorum principium est materia, sed
universalia tantum • • •
~ Anima, q.u..'1.a.20.
In abstracting the universal from the phantasm the mind leaves aside all the
properties and accidents which make the object to be this particular man or
horse.

The intellect understands directly the universal form man, for
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example, as man, not as Socrates or Plato.

However were the intellect unable

to go further and in some manner know also the matter which is intrinsic to
the object, its knowledge would be inadequate.

Although through the mental

concept alone the intellect is unable to distinguish one particular man from
another, yet by turning to the phantasm which is a representation of the
singular the intellect is able to know, indirectly, the singular individual
thing.
• • • mens nostra singulare directe cognoscere non
potest; sed directe cognoscitur a nobis singulare per
virtutes sensitivas, quae recipiunt formas a rebus
in organo corporali; et sic recipiunt eas sub determinatis dimensionibus, 3t secundum quod ducunt in cognitionem materiae singularis. Sicut enim forma universalis ducit in cognitionem materiae universalis ita
forma individualis ducit in cognitionem materiae signatae, quae est individuationis principium. Sed taman
mens per. accidens singularibus se immiscet, inquantum
continuatur viribus sensitivis, quae circa particularia
versantur. Quae quidem continuatio est dupliciter.
Uno modo inquantum motus sensitivae partis terminatur
ad mentem, sicut accidit in motu qui est a rebus ad
animam; et sic mens singulars cognoscit per quamdam
reflexionem, prout scilicet mens cognos9endo obiectumsuum, quod est aliqua natura universalis, redit
in oognitionem sui actus, et ulterius in speciem quae
est actus sui principium, et ulterius in phantasmata
a quo species est abstracta; at sic aliquam cognitionem
de singulari accipit. Alio modo secundumquod motus qui
est ab anima ad res, incipit a mente, et procedit in
partem sensitivam, prout mens regit inferiores vires; et
sic singularibus se immiscet movente ratione particulari,
quae est potentia quaedam individualis quae alio nomine
dicitur cogitativa, et habet determinatum organum, in
corpore, • • • Universalem vero sententiam quam mens
habet de operabilibus, non est possibile applicari ad
particularem actum nisi per aliquam potentiam mediam
apprehendentem singulare • • •
DeVer., q.lO.a.5.c.

57

In order to understand things the mind is able to abstract from sensible
tmages the likeness of external objects, and by means of the likeness to
understand the objects themselves.

Now the likeness by which the intellect

understands is the form of the intellect.

The intellect is also able to

understand itself, but since it understands nothing without a sensible image,
it is in understanding exterior things that it understands itself •
• • • intellectus humanus etsi sa ipsum cognoscere possit,
taman primum suae cognitionis initium ab extrinseco sumit:
quia non est intelligere sine phantasmata. • •
~·~·Gent., IV. 11.
As the intellect cannot understand exterior things through its essence, so
neither can it understand itself through itself.
Impossibile est autem dici quod per sa ipsam intelligat
de se quid est.
~·~·~·• III. 46.
The intellect can know only what is actual, as pure potentiality is unknowable.

Thus the intellect cannot know primary matter, which is pure potency.

It is only when the matter is informed that it becomes intelligible.

The

human intellect, as was said, is analagous to primary matter since it is a
capacity for forms, and, like prime matter, until it is informed or made
actual it is unknowable.

Now it is through the intelligible species that

the intellect is informed and becomes actual, and it is only then that it
itself can be known to itself.

Thus it is not through its essence, but

through its act, that the intellect knows itself.
That the intellectual soul does not know itself through its essence can
be shown in several ways.

Since all men have souls if the soul knew itself
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through itself it would follow that all men would know the nature of their
soul.

But this is not the case.

Likewise, if the soul were known to itself

through its essence it would be naturally known.

Now in those things which

are known naturally, as the whole is greater than its parts, error is impossible.

There could then be no error regarding the nature of the soul.

Yet

there is error, so the intellectual soul does not know itself through its
essence, but through its act._
Si anima per se ipsam cognoscit de sa quid est; omnis
autem homo animam habet: omnis igitur homo cognoscit
de anima quid est; quod patet esse falsum.
Cognitio quae sit per aliquid naturaliter nobis
inditum, est naturalis, sicut principia indemonstrabilia,
quae cognoscuntur per lumen intellectus agentis. Si
igitur nos de anima scimus quid est per ipsam animam,
hoc erit naturaliter notum. In his autem quae naturaliter nota sunt, nullus potest errare: in cognitione enim
principiorum indemonstrabilium nullus errat. Nullus
igitur erraret circa animam quid est, si hoc anima per
se ipsam cognosceret: quod patet esse falsum, quum
multi opinati sint animam esse hoc, vel illud corpus,
et aliqui numerum, vel harmoniam. Non igitur anima
per se ipsam cognoscit de sa quid est.
~·~·Gent.,

III. 46.

The intellectual soul understands itself through its act and not through its
essence.
Intellectus autem humanus se habet in genera rerum intelligibilium ut ens in potentia tantum, sicut et
materia prima se habet in genera rerum sensibilium,
unde possibilis nominatur. Sic igitur in sua essentia
consideratus se habet ut potentia intelligens. Unde
ex seipso habet virtutem ut intelligat, non autem ut
intelligatur, nisi secundum id quod fit actu • • • Sed
quia connaturale est intellectui nostro secundum
statum praesantis vitae quod ad materilia et sensibilia
respiciat. • .consequens est ut sic seipsum intelligat
intellectus noster, secundum quod fit actu per species
a sensibilibus abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis,
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quod est actus ipsorum intelligibilium; et eis mediantibus intelligit intellectus possibilis. Non ergo
per essentiam suam, sed per actum suum se cognoscit
intellectus noster • • •
~.Theol., I.q.87.a.l.c.
The intellect is superior to sense because it is capable not only of knowing
other things, but of knowing itself also, and of distinguishing between itself and what it knows, between self and things outside self.

The senses are

capable of sense knowledge, but not of intellectual knowledge because they
cannot reflect on self and perceive that they know.
Est igitur supremus et perfectus gradus vitae qui est
secundum intellectum, nam intellectus in seipsum reflectitur et seipsum intelligere potest.
~·~·Gent., III. 11.
It is because the intellect knows itself and thus is able to distinguish between itself and what it knows or what is not itself that it can have intel•
lectual knowledge •
• • • veritas est in intellectu, et in sensu, licet non
eodam modo. In intellectu enim est sicut consequens
actum intellectus, et sicut cognita per intellectum,
consequitur namque intellectus operationem, secundum
quod judicium intellectus est de re secundum quod est;
cognoscitur autem ab intellectu quod intellectus
reflectitur supra actum suum, non solum secundum quod
cognoscit actum suum, sed secundum quod cognoscit
proportionem ejus ad rem: quod quidem cognosci non
potest nisi cognita natura ipsius actus, quae cognosci
non potest, nisi cognoscitur natura principii activi,
quod est ipse intellectus, in cuius natura est ut
rebus conformetur: unde secundum hoc cognoscit veritatem intellectus quod supra se ipsum reflectitur • • •
~ ~· q.l.a.9.c.
Since the intellectual soul, while united to the body, is able to understand only by turning to phantasms it follows that immaterial substances, of
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•hich there can be no material representation, cannot be understood by the
intellect.

The soul understands itself only indirectly and through its act

as was said:
Zx objecto enim cognoscit su~ operationem, per qu~
devenit ad cognitionem sui ipsius • • •
E! Anima, q.un.a.3.ad 4.
The reason for this inability of the soul to understand immaterial substances
lies in the weakness of the soul's intellectual power, for in themselves the
Lmmaterial substances are more intelligible than are material objects.

The

intellect in the presence of such substances is, as it were, blinded by the
very intelligibility of such beings •
• • • difficultas intelligendi res illas accidit ex
nobis, non ex illis: nam intellectus noster se habet
ad manifestissima rerum sicut se habet oculus vespertilionis ad lucam Solis.
The possible intellect in this life can be informed only by species abstracted from phantasms, and since there can be no phantasm of a separated substance the intellectual soul cannot know such beings.
Non est igitur intellectus possibilis in potentia n~s~
ad illa intelligibilia quae sunt facta per intellectum
asentem. • .Cum ergo substantiae separatae non sint
factae in actu per intellectum agentem, sed solum
materialia; ad haec sola se extendit possibilis intellectus. Non igitur per ipsum possimus intelligere
substantias separatas.
~·~·Gent., III. 45.
However, since the intellectual soul is able to understand itself indirectly,
and since it is itself an immaterial subsisting thing, it can by analogy
have some inadequate knowledge of the separate substances.

61

Since the soul is unable to know separate substances either through itself or through its knowledge of material things, much less is it able to
knOW

God directly and as the First Object of its understanding.

The reason

is that no abstracted species can adequately represent either separate substances or God, and in the present life the soul cannot know things which
are not thus represented.
1ienti igitur nostrae in statu viae non potest convenire
visio Dei per essentiam secundum primum modum. Mens
enim nostra naturali cognitions phantasmata respicit
quasi obiecta, a quibus species intelligibiles accipit ••
• • unde omne quod intelligit secundum statum viae, intelligit per species a phantasmatibus abstractas.
Nulla autem species huiusmodi sufficiens est ad representandam divinam essentiam, vel etiam euiuscumque alterius essentiae separatae; cum quidditates rerum sensibilium, quarum similitudines sunt intelligibiles species
a phantasmatibus abstractae, sint alterius rationis ab
essentiis substantiarum immaterialium creaturum, et
multo magis ab essentia divina. Unde mens nostra naturali cognitione, quam in statu viae experimur, nee
Deum, nee Angelos per essentiam videre potest • • •
E!~·· q.lO.a.ll.c.

CHAPTER III
Since the union of soul and body is natural to the soul and since while
this union exists the human soul has a real, though extrinsic, dependence
on the body a difficulty arises concerning the lcnowledge of the separated
soul.

If, so long as the soul is united to the body, the phantasms are

necessary for the intellectual operation, can that operation be carried on
when the phantasms no longer exist?
The intellectual soul, the substantial form of the human body, is an
immaterial subsisting thing, as was shown.

Being immaterial it is conse-

quently incorruptible, for matter is the principle of disintegration •
• • • anima humana omnino est immaterialis; quod patet
ex hoc quod rerum species immatarialiter recipit. Ergo
anima est incorruptibilis.
~ P~ima, q.un.a.l4.c.
When therefore, the material body is corrupted the soul will remain uncorrupted, separated from the body.

This can be shown in several ways.

A thing is received in another according to the mode of the recipient.
Now forms of things are raceived in the possible intellect in as much as
they are intelligible in act; and they are intelligible in act in so far as
they are immaterial and universal and consequently incorruptible.

The pos-

sible intellect is therefore incorruptible and since the possible intellect
, is part of the human soul it follows that the human soul is incorruptible.
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Intelligibile est propria perfectio intellectus: unde
intellectus in actu. et intelligibile in actu. sunt
unum. Quod igitur convenit intelligibili 1 inquantum
est intelligibile. oportet convenire intellectui inquantum, huiusmodi: quia perfectio, at perfectibile
sunt unius generis. Intelligibile autem, inquantum est
intelligibile, est necessarium. et incorruptibile:
necessaria enim perfecte sunt intellectu cognoscibilia;
contingentia vera, inquantum huiusmodi, non nisi deficienter, habetur enim de eis non scientia, sed opinio:
unde et incorruptibilium intellectus scientiam habet,
secundum quod sunt incorruptibilia, inquantum scilicet
sunt universalia. Oportet igitur intellectum esse incorruptibilem.
And again:
Unumquodque quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo
secundum modum eius in quo est. Formae autem rerum
recipiuntur in intellectu possibili, prout sunt intelligibiles actu: sunt autem intelligibiles actu prout
sunt immateriales, at universales, at per consequens
incorruptibiles. .Ergo intellectus possibilis est incorruptibilis. Sed • • • intellectus possibilis est
aliquid animae humanae. Est igitur anima humana incorruptibilis.
II ~.Gent., 79.
The acting intellect makes the intelligible to be intelligible in act,
which intelligible is incorruptible.

In this act of abstracting the intelli-

gible the acting intellect is the agent and that which is rendered intelligible in act is the patient.

Since the agent is more noble than the patient,

• • • agens est honorabilius patiente • • •
~.Theol.,

I.q.84.a.6.c.

it follows that the human soul, of which the acting intellect is the light,
is incorruptible.
Faciens est honorabilius factu • • .sed intellectus agens
facit actu intelligibilia. • .Quum igitur intelligibilia
actu, inquantum huiusmodi, sint incorruptibilia, multo
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fortius intellectus agens erit incorruptibilis. Ergo at
anima humana, cuius lumen est intellactus agens, ut ax
praemiscis patet.
II ~.Gent., 79.
The proper object of the intellect is the intelligible which is necessarily
incorruptible, for things are intelligible and incorruptible in so far as
they are immaterial.
• • • sicut res sunt separabiles a materia, sic circa
intellectum sunt.
~.Theol., I.q.85.a.l.c.
now the intellect actually understanding is one with the object actually
understood.
• • intellectum in actu est intellectus in actu,
in quantum similitude rei intellectae est forma
intellectus.
~.Theol., I.q.85.a.2.ad 2um.
Since the intelligible is the proper perfection of the intellect and perfaction and perfectible are proportionate it follows that the intellect
must be incorruptible.
Proprium perfectivum hominis secundum animam, est
aliquid incorruptibile propria enim operatic hominis,
inquantum huiusmodi, est intelligere, per hanc enim
differt a brutis, et plantis, et inanimatis: intelligere enim est universalium, et incorruptibilium
inquantum huiusmodi. Perfectiones aute.m oportet esse
perfectibilibus proportionatas. Ergo anima humane.
est incorruptibilis.
II~·~·, 79.

The human soul as was said is the form of the body.
corrupted in three ways:

Now a form can be

through the action of its contrary, as heat is

destroyed by the action of cold; or through the corruption of its subject,
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as the pcrwer of vision is destroyed with the corruption of the eye; or
through the defect of its cause, as light is lacking in the air when the
6 un,

which is the cause of that light, is not present.

not be destroyed in any of these three ways.

The human soul can-

It cannot be destroyed through

the action of its contrary for there is nothing qontrary to it,

since~en

contraries are not such as present in the soul •
• • • owne quod corrumpitur habet contraria, vel est
ex contrariis compositum. Sed anima humana est
omnino absque contrarietate; quia illa etiam quae
sunt contraria in se, in anima non sunt contraria;
rationes enim contrariorum in anima contrariae non
sunt. Ergo anima humana est incorruptibilis.
~Anima, q.un.a.l4.c.
Nor can the human soul be corrupted through the corruption of its subject,
for the soul is a form not dependent on the body according to its being.
Nor can it be destroyed through the defect of its cause, for the soul can
have none but an eternal cause.

Consequently the human soul is incorrupt-

ible.
Similiter autem neque per corruptionem sui subjecti: • • •
quod anima humana est forma non dependens a corpore
secundum suum esse. Similiter autem neque per deficientiam suae ~ausae: quia non potest habere aliquam
causam nisi aeternam. • .Nullo igitur modo anima
humana corrumpi potest.
II ~.Gent., 79.
Similiter etiam anima intellectiva, cum habeat operationem vitae sine corpore, est subsistens, • • • et
ita sibi debetur esse et fieri; et cum immaterialis
substantia, non potest causari per generationem, sed
solum per creationem a Deo. Ponere ergo anima intellectivam a generante causari, nihil est aliud quam
ponere earn non subsistentem, et per consequens corrumpi earn cum corpore • • •
~.Theol., I.q.ll8.a.2.c.
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Moreover, the human soul, being a subsisting form has existence of itself
independently of the body.

In this it differs from accidents and purely

material forms, which cannot exist apart from their subjects.

Now existence

follows upon form, and a thing exists in as much as it has a form.

Thus the

body informed by the soul is said to exist, and once it is deprived of its
substantial form it cannot be said to exist as a human body.

A subsisting

form has existence of itself and whatever belongs to a thing in virtue of
itself cannot be separated from it.

Thus roundness belongs to a circle,

and because of the very nature of a circle cannot be separated from it.

If

therefore a circle were a subsistent form it could not cease to be other
than round.

Since existence belongs to the soul in this way the substantial

soul cannot cease to exist.
Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est omnino anL~ humana
incorruptibilem esse. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum
est, quod id quod per se consequitur ad aliquid, non
potast removeri ad eo; sicut ab homine non removetur
quod sit animal; neque a numero quod sit par vel impar.
Manifestum est autem quod esse per se consequitur formam:
unumquodque enim habet esse secundum propriam formam;
unde esse a forma nullo modo separari potest. Corrumpuntur igitur composita ex materia at forma per hoc quod
amittunt formam ad quam consequitur esse. Ipsa aute.m
forma per se corrumpi non potest; sed per accidens
corrupto composite oorrumpitur, in quantum deficit esse
compositi quod est per formam; si forma sit talis quae
non sit habens esse, sed sit solum quo compositum est.
Si ergo sit aliqua forma quae sit habens esse, necesse
est illam formam incorruptibilem esse. Non separatur
esse ab aliquo habente esse, nisi per hoc quod separatur
forma ab eo; unde si id quod habet esse, sit ipsa forma,
impossibile est quod esse separatur ab eo. Manifestum
est autem quod principium quo homo intelligit, est forma
habens esse in se, et non solum sicut quo aliquid est • • •
Relinquitur ergo quod principium intellectivum quo homo
intelligit, sit forma habens esse; unde necesse est
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quod sit incorruptibilis • • •
~Anima,

q.un.a.l4.c.

It is in virtue of its being an immaterial substance that the human
soul is both incorruptible and intellectual.

Therefore the soul cannot

cease to be, nor cease to be intellectual, even when separated from the
body.

Now a form which has no operation of its own apart from the matter it

informs cannot exist apart from that matter.

Thus heat or the form of an

apple cannot exist apart from their subject.

But the human soul is not such

a form for even while united to the body it has an operation in which the
body does not share, namely understanding.
• • • in anima nostra sunt quaedam vires quarum operationes per organa corporea exercentur; et hujusmodi vires
sunt actus quarumdam partium corporis • • • Quaedam vero
vires anima nostrae sunt quarum operationes per organa
corporea non exercantur, ut intellectus at voluntas;
et hujusmodi non sunt actus aliquarum partium corporis.
~.Theel., I.q.54.a.5.c.
This power of understanding is the soul's highest and most proper operation
and cannot be separated from the soul •
• • • nulla substantia destituitur propria operatione.
Sed propria operatic animae rationalis est inteliigere.
Ergo post mortem anima intelligit.
E!~·~ 19.a.l.c.
St. Thomas answers the objection that since the human soul cannot
understand without turning to the phantasms, the separated soul, having no
such phantasms to which it can turn, will be unable to understand.

The

phantasms are necessary to the soul in union with the body because in that
state the soul does not participate in the intelligible species as do
separate substances, but must receive species abstracted from the phantasms.
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soul is dependent on the phantaams for material with which to
carry on its operation, but it is in no way dependent on the body in the
exercise of this operation.

Consequently the separated soul can understand

if in some way it can be provided with intelligible species.

Now while

united to the body the soul understands itself, indirectly it is true, yet
not through a phantasm of itself but through its act.

Since the soul,

whether present in the body or separated from it, will always be present to
itself it

~~11

be able to understand if by some means it is actual •

• • • mens ipsa sicut corporearum rerum notitias per
sensus corporis colligit, sic rerum incorporearum
per semetipsam. Sed ipsa semper sibi praesens erit.
De~·· 19.a.l.c.
The intellectual soul is unable to understand without the phantasm because
its union with matter renders it passive.

But anything which is passive

because of its union with matter is rendered active by its separation from
that matter.

A form which can exist apart from the matter it informs is

active ru1d not passive.
union with matter.

Thus heat is both active and passive because of its

If however, it were possible for the form heat to exist

thout matter it would be active and not passive.

Therefore the separated

longer united to the body and consequently no lon;er passive,
11 be able to understand at least itself without receiving species from
exterior objects, that is, abstracted species.
Sicut aliquid ex coniunctione ad corpus materiale
redditur passivum ita per separationem ab eadem
redditur activum: calidum enim et agit, et patitur
propter coniunctionem caloris ad materiam; si autem
esset calor sine materia, ageret, et non pateretur.
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Ergo et anima per separationem a corpore redditur
omnino activa. Sed quod potentiae animae non possunt
per se ipsas cognoscere sine exterioribus obieotis.
hoc eis competit inquantum sunt passivae • • • Ergo
anima per separationem a corpore poterit per se ipsam
intelligere, non accipiendo ab aliquibus obiectis.
De~·· l9.a.l.c.
This is because the end of the

intel~ective

power is not to know the phan-

tasm, but rather, to know the intelligible species.

Now although the proper

end of a thing is always the same yet nothing prevents a thing from
realizing its ena from different points in different modes or states of
existence.

Thus the proper end of the power of vision is to see color and

of the power of hearing to hear sound.

If then, color be wanting to the

eye the proper operation of the power of sight cannot be carried on.

Like-

wise, if sound be wanting the proper operation of the power of hearing cannot be carried on.

Now the phantasm is not the object of the intellect in

the same ·way that color is the object of the power of sight. but rather the
intellect, so long as the soul is united to the body, finds its proper object in the phantasm.

This object is the intelligible species.

Manifestum est enim quod finis potentiae visivae est
cognoscere colores; finis autem potentiae intellectiva
non est cognoscere phantasmata. sed cognoscere species
intelligibiles, quas apprehendit a phantasmatibus,
et in phantasmatibus secundum statum praesentis vitae.
Bst igitur similitudi quantum ad hoc ad quod aspicit
utraque potentia, non autam quantum ad hoc in quod
utriusque potentiae conditio terminatur. Nihil autem
prohibet secundum diversos status ex diversis rem
aliquam ad suum finem tenders. Finis taman proprius
alicujus rei semper est unus. Et ideo licet visus
nihil cognoscat absque colore: intellectus taman
secundum aliquem statum potest cognoscere absque
phantasmate, sed non absque specie intelligibili.
Sum.Theol., III. q.ll.a.2. ad 1
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NoW intelligible species may be divided into two classes.

First are the

of material things which exist in a more material way in the things
knower, and are abstracted from things in order that they

may be rendered intelligible.

These are called abstracted species.

secondly are those forms which exist in a more simple way in the things
themselves than in the knower.

These are called impressed species.

Sciendum taman est, quod non semper species per quam
aliquid cognoscitur, est abstracta are quae per ipsam
cognoscitur; sed tunc solum quando cognoscens accipit
speciem a re; et tunc haec species accepta, est simplicitior et immaterialior in cognoscente quam in re
quae cognoscitur. Si autem fuerit a contrario, scilicet
quod res cognita immaterialior sit et simplicior quam
cognoscens; tunc species rei cognitae in cognoscente
non dicitur abstracta, sed impressa et influxa • • •
~Anima, q.un.a.l7 .a.ad 4um.
Thus the soul is naturally perfected in two ways, either by knowledge
received from sensible things or by knowledge received from superior
spiritual substances.

Once the intelligible species through which the soul

receives its most proper and distinct knowledge are no longer available
because of the soul's separation from the body, the soul will be able to
understand through the impressed species.

Nor is this mode of understanding

contrary to the nature of the soul even though it is above it, as was said.

An indication that the separated soul will be able to understand \dthout the phantasm is found even in the soul's present state of existence.
Thus, while united to the body the soul is better able to carry on its
proper operation when withdrawn from excessive care of the body.

The more

a man is occupied with things of sense the less is he concerned about im-
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~terial

things and the less apt is he for intellectual pursuits.

It would

seem that just as objects are the more intelligible as they exist in a more
tmmaterial way, so too the intellect is more capable of understanding the
more it withdraws from material cares and occupations •
• • • anima, quanto abstrahitur a corporalibus, aptior
redditur ad percipiendum influxum spiritualium substantiarum, et etiam ad percipiendum subtiles motus,
qui ex impressionibus naturalium causarum in imaginatione humana relinquitur, a quibus percipiendis anima
impeditur, cum fuerit circa sensibilia occupata.
~.Theol., II II, q.l72.a.l.ad 1
Likewise the intellectual operation can sometimes be carried on with an
extraordinary independence of matter, as in dreams and ecstasy, when the
senses are not acting.

~~en

the intellect is not being provided with phan-

tasms through which it can receive intelligible species, and is, as it were,
blank, it would seem to be subject to the influence of superior beings and
to be informed by them.

.Thus men sometimes can receive through the influenc

of superior substances knowledge which surpasses the ordinary knowledge
received through

ab~tracted

species.

• • • anima quando impeditur ab occupatione circa corpus
proprium, redditur debilior ad intelligendum aliqua
altiora; unde et virtus temperantiae, quae a corporeis
delectationibus retrahit animam, praecipue facit homines
ad intelligendum aptos. Homines etiam dormientes, quando
corporeis sensibus non utuntur, neo est aliqua perturnatio
humorum, aut fumositatum impediens, percipiunt de futuuis
ex superiorum impressions aliqua quae modum ratiocinationis
humanae excedunt: et hoc multo magis accidit in syncopizantibus, et extasim passis, quanto magis fit retractio a
corporeis sensibus.
Thus while united to the body the soul tends towards inferior things and
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its knowledge from inferior things.

But When freed from the body

the soul tends towards superior things and likewise receives knowledge
through their influence.
Manifestum est enim quod anima humana corpori unita
aspectum habet ex unione corporis ad inferiora directum;
unde non perficitur nisi per ea quae ab inferioribus
accipit, scilicet per species a phantasmatibus abstractas; unde neque in cognitionem sui ipsius neque in cognitionem aliorum potest devenire, nisi in quantum ex
praedictis speciebus manuducitur, ut supra dictum est.
Sed quando jam anima erit a corpore separata, aspectus
ejus non ordinabitur ad aliqua inferiora, ut ab eis
accipiat; sed erit absolutus, patens a superioribus
substantiis influentiam recipere sine inspections
phantasmatatum• • • ; et per hujusmodi influentiam
reducetur in actum. • •
E! Anima, q.un.a.l7.
This is because the intellectual soul is on the boundary of the corporeal
and incorporeal worlds and as it is drawn towards the material it is withdrawn from the consideration of the immaterial, while as it withdraws from
the corporeal it mora nearly approaches the incorporeal and is more influenced by separate substances.
Anima in sui separations a corpore, recipit influxum
specierum intelligibilium a natura superiori, scilicet
divina, secundum naturalem ordinem, quo experimur quod
anima humana quanto magis a corporeis sensibus abstrahitur, magis potest esse particeps superioris influxus;
sicut patet in dormientibus et alienatis, qui etiam
quaedam futura praevident.
Quodl., III, a.e.a.2l.c.
And again:
• • • anima humana sit in confinio corporum, et incorporearum substantiarum, quasi in horizonte existens
aeternitatis, et temporis, recedens ad infima appropinquat ad summum: unde et quando totaliter erit a
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corpore separata, perfecte assimilabitur substantiis
separatis quantum.ad modum intelligendi, et uberius
influentiam earum recipiet. Sic igitur etsi intelligere nostrum secundum modum praesentis vitae, oorrupto corpore, corrumpatur, succedet tamen alius modus
intelligendi altior.
II ~.Gent., 81.
Thus in dreams one can receive knowledge concerning the future through the
influence of separate substances.
Utrumque autem melius potest fieri in dormientibus quam
in vigilantibus, quia anima vigilantis est occupata circa
exteriora sensibilia: unde minus potest recipere subtiles
impressiones vel spiritualium substantiarum, vel etiam
causarum naturalium. • •
Sum.Theol.,II II; q.l72.a.l.c.
If the soul united to the body can be thus influenced by separate substances
it would seem that the separated soul, wholly unimpeded by the body, would
be even more open to such influence.
Uow the manner of the activity proper to a thing corresponds to the
mode and nature of its substance.
itself, away from any body.

An intelligence subsisting apart is by

Therefore its intellectual activity will be

conversant with objects not based on anything corporeal.

The soul's nature

is not changed by its separation from the body, but its mode of existence is
changed so its mode of operation will be different also.

The separated soul

will be a substance subsisting apart from matter and its intellectual activi
ty will be like that of separate substances.
• • • anima separata per suum intellectum recipit
species intelligibiles per modum superioris substantiae • • •
~Anima, q.un.a.20.ad 17um.

.........

________________
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Now in referring to the separate substances st. Thomas says:
Modus operationis propriae alicuius rei proportionaliter
respondet modo substantiae, et naturae ipsius. Substantia autem separata est intellectus per se existens,
non in corpore aliquo. Operatic igitur intellectualis
eius erit intelligibilium quae non sunt fundata in
aliquo corpore. Omnia autem intelligibilia a sensibilibus accepta, sunt in aliquibus corporibus aliqualiter
fundata, sicut intelligibilia nostra in phantasmatibus,
quae sunt in organic corporeis. Substantiae igitur
separatae non accipiunt cognitionem ex sensibilibus.
II ~·~·• 96.
Because inferior things are not ordered to inferiors the separated soul will
no longer be ordered to material representations in carrying on its proper
operation.

It will understand in a way suitable to its mode of existence,

that is, by turning to participated species, sharing with
stances the influence of the Divine Light.

sep~rate

sub-

However our intellect stands in

such pressing need of particular detailed likenesses that for every distinct
object of knowledge it requires a distinct likeness in itself.

It knows

each different specific nature by a different intelligible species.

Thus

through the more universal idea "animal" the soul has only an indistinct
idea of "rational" and "irrational."

Therefore because of its weakness the

soul is provided with two powers, sense and intellect, in order that it may
know what superior intellects know by a single power, intellect.
Intellectus autem noster, quia infimum gradum tenet in
substantiis intellectualibus, adeo particulatas similitudines requirit quod unicuique cognoscibili proprio
oportet respondere propriam similitudinem in ipso:
unde per similitudinem animalis non cognoscit rationale,
et per consequens nee hominem, nisi secundum quid.
Similitude autem intelligibilis, quae est in substantia
separata, est universalioris virtutis ad plura repraesentanda sufficiens; et ideo non facit imperfectiorem
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cognitionem, sed perfectiorem: est enim universalis
virtus ad modum formae agentis in causa universali,
quae quanta fuerit universalior, tanto ad plura se
extendit, et efficacius producit. Per sirrdlitudinem
igitur unam cognoscit et animal, at differentias
animalis, aut etiam· universaliori modo, et contractiori secundum ordinem substantiarum praedictarum.
II ~·~·• 98.

Although the knowledge of the separate substances is not proportionate to
the intellectual soul it does not follow that the soul can have no knowledge
from the influx of these substances, but only that this knowledge will be
confused and imperfect.
• • • anima separata per suum intellectum recipit species
intelligibiles per modum superioris substantiae, in qua
virtute cognoscitur quod homo duabus virtutibus, scilicet
sensu at intellectu, cognoscit.
_£::Anima, q.un.a.20. ad 17um.
And:

• • • quod ex hoc quod scientia substantiarum separatarum
non est proportionate. animae nostrae, non sequitur quod
nullwm intelligentiam ex earum influxu capera possit;
sed solum quod non possit capere perfectam at distinctam • • •
.£!Anima, q.un.a.l5. ad 2lum.
Because the soul is the lowest of the intellectual substances this mode of
understanding is not natural to it simply but only in so far as the soul is
separated, and it will receive the emanation of the intelligible light in
the lowest mode.

This corresponds to understanding the phantasm made in-

telligible in act.
Raec autem cognitio, ut cognoscat praedicto modo substantias separatas, est sibi naturalis, non simpliciter,
sed in quantum est unita, non competit sibi •
.£!.Anima, q.un.a.l7. ad 2um.
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Since independence of matter

me~es

a thing to be a proper tena of in-

tellect it cannot be that the different mode of understanding follows from
the difference in intelligible species; but rather, the difference comes
from the mode of existence of the separated soul, because operation follows
from mode of existence.

Thus the intellectual operation is not diversified

by the intelligible species, whether these species are recieved from the
phantasms or fro.m some other thing •
• • • diversus modus intelligendi non provenit ex diversitate specierum, sed ex diverse statu animae intelligentis.
Sum.Theol., I. q.89.a.6.ad 2um •
• • • operatic propria animae est intelligere intelligibilia actu. Nee per hoc diversificatur species intellectualis operationis, quod intelligibilia actu
sunt accepta a phantasmatibus vel aliunde.
De Anima, q.un.a.l5.ad lOum.
Moreover, to view a thing intellectually belongs to the potential intellect
which forms the mental concept from the intelligible species and thus understands.
Intellectus enim possibilis est in actu perfecto
secundum species intelligibiles, cum considerat actu • • •
II ~.Gent., 74.
Since this intellect is in potentiality to universal being it can be informed by intelligible species, whether abstracted or impressed, and thus
:made actual.
~nile

united to the body the soul has one mode of understanding, by

turning to the phantasm.

Separated from the body it will be able to under-

stand by means of impressed species,
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• • • anima, cum est corpori unita, si haberet species
innatas, per eas posset intelligere, sicut intelligit
per acquisitas. Sed licet sit perfectior in natura sua
taman propter motus sues corporeos at occupationes
sensibiles retinetur ut non possit ita libere conjungi
substantiis superioribus ad recipiendum influxum earum,
sicut post separationem.
~Anima, q.un.a.l5. ad 13um.
nor will this be the only mode by which the soul will understand.

Since the

knowledge acquired in union with the body is not destroyed by death the
soul will be able to know what it formerly knew, to know that is, through
species which it received while united to the body.

Likewise the soul will

see the separate substances and thus both know them and the species of
things in them.

Thus the separated soul will know by three modes.

Ex quibus colligi potest quod anima post mortem tribus
modis intelligit: uno modo per species quas recipit a
rebus dum erat in corpore; alia modp per species in ipsa
sua separations a corpore sibi divinitus infusas; tertio
modo videndo substantias separatas, et in eis species
rerum intuendo. • •
~ ~·, l9.a.l.
The soul will be able to understand through species

fo~erly

received

in the body.
Habebunt etiam animae separatae determinatam cognitionem
eorum quae prius hie sciverunt, quorum species intelligibiles conservantur in eis.
E! Anima, q.un.a.l5.c.
Since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is incorruptible, it cannot
be corrupted through the corruption of its subject.

Nor can knowledge be

corrupted through its contrary, for there is nothing contrary to the meaning
of intelligible things.

Since forgetfulness has no place in the separated
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soul knowledge formerly acquired cannot be destroyed in this way.

Nor can

the knowledge in the separated soul be destroyed through a false argument.
Manifestum est autem quod per corruptionem subjeoti
scientia quae est L~ intellectu humano, corrumpi non
potest; cum intellectus sit incorruptibilis, • • •
Similiter etiam nee per contrarium corrumpi possunt
species intelligibiles quae sunt in intellectu possibili; quia intentioni intelligibilium nihil est
contrarium, et praecipue quantum ad simplicem intelligentiam, qua intelligitur quod quid est. Sed quantum
ad operationem qua intelleetUScomponit et dividit, vel
etiam ratiocinatur, sic invenitur contrarietas in intellectu, secundum quod falsum in propositione, vel
argumentations est contrarium vero. Et hoc modo interdum scientia corrumpitur per contrarium, dum scilicet
aliquis per falsam argumentationem abducitur a scientia
veritatis • • • Sed hoc non habet locum in anima separata.
Unde dicendum est quod habitus scientiae secundum quod
est in intellectu, manet in anima separata.
~.Theol., I.q.89.a.5.
This knowledge alone however would not suffice:
• • • anima post mortem intelligit per aliquas species.
Potest quidem intelligere per species quas in corpore
acquisivit, quamvis illae usquequaque non sufficiant • • •
_E! !!!:·• 19.a.l.ad lOum.
The soul would be unable to know any more than it knew on earth were it
limited to species acquired here, and the souls of children would have no
knowledge, neither of which can be admitted.

Nmv

since understanding can-

not be accomplished without a certain receiving of impressions the separated
soul will be dependent on impressions received from separate substances,
and because the soul existing apart from the body is itself a separate substance this mode of understanding is fitting.
Actus autem proportionatur ei cujus est actus.
~.Theol., I.q.l2.a.3.c.
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A thing can be natural according to one mode of existence and not natural
according to another.

Thus water in a solid state, ice, does not tend to

rise, while water existing in the form of steam does tend to rise.

Like-

wise, what is not possible to the soul in one state of existence is possible
to it in another, and its mode of knowledge differs according to its mode
of existence.
Uni enim at eidem rei est aliquid contra naturam, et
secundum naturam secundum eius status diversos, eo
quod non est eadem natura rei dum est in fieri, et
dum est in perfecto esse. • .sicut quantitas completa
est naturalis homini cum ad perfectam pervenerit
aetatem, asset autem contra naturam puero, si in
perfecta quantitate nascereretur • • •
~·~·· 13.a.l.ad lum.
Since the soul is a separate substance and like is known by like it will
know separate substances.
• • .Similitude est causa cognitionis.
~!!::.·•

q.8.a.7.c.

The soul is intelligent because it has a passive capacity for all being.
The more material a thing is the less capable is it of having knowledge.
Thus things which merely exist, as a stone, can have no knowledge for they
cannot receive another form while retaining their own.

Sentient things are

capable of receiving some forms while remaining themselves and are thus
capable of some knowledge.

The human intellect, being immaterial, is able

to receive the forms of all things, to know all things.
Inter parfectiqnes autem rerum potissima est quod aliquid
sit intellectivum: nam per hoc ipsum est quodammodo
omnia, habens in se omnium perfeotiones • • •
I Cont.~., 44.

•
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consequently the object of the intellect, whether in the body or separated
therefrom, is reality; its function is to grasp reality.
Proprium autem obiectum intellectus est quod quid est.
II~·~·· 56.

Naturae autem intellectuales maiorem habent affinitatam
ad totum quam aliae naturae: nam unaquaeque intellectualis substantia est quodammodo omnia, inquantum totius
entis comprehensiva est suo intellectu • • •
III Cont .Gent., 112.
Even while united to the body the soul's knowledge extends to whatever is
subject to the light of the active intellect, namely the natures of material
things.

lJow

in this life the soul is aided by the body, but it is at the

same time enveloped by the body and prevented from receiving the influence
of separate substances.

Since the soul's nature is not changed by its

separation from the body the object of its knmvledge will be all being and
it 'rill be more capable of receiving knowledge of all being in the universal
Est autem aliud genus potentiarum animae quod respicit
adhuc universalius objectum, scilicet non solum corpus
sensibile, sed etiam universaliter omne ens.
Sum.Theol., I.q.S7.a.l.
Being separated from the body the soul's intellectual activity will be conversant with objects not based on anything corporeal,
• • • substantiae separatae non accipiunt intellectivam
cognitionem ex rebus sensibilibus.
II~·~·· 96.
Since the knowledge which man acquired in this world will not be
destroyed after death,
• • • notitia eorum quae homo in hoc mundo scit, non
tollitur post mortem.
De Anima, q.un.a.l5.o.
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and since this knowledge was of things below the soul, material things, it
follows that the soul will be able to know at least some material things.
Moreover, forms which are higher possess those which are lower.

Just as

bodies which are living have the lower form of mere existence and those
which have sensation are necessarily living, while those which have rational
knowledge are necessarily sentient, the higher always including the lower
forms in a more excellent manner.

So too, the likenesses of inferior things

are found in superior beings in a more excellent way.
• • • anima separata secundum quid intelligit omnia
naturalia, sed non simpliciter. Ad cujus evidentiam
considerandum est, quod talis est ordo rerum ad invicem,
ut quaecumque inveniuntur in inferiori natura, inveniantur excellentius in superiori; sicut ea quae sunt in
istis generabilibus et corruptibilibus, sunt nobiliori
modo in corporibus caelestibus, sicut in causis universalibus. Calidum enim et frigidum, et alia hujusmodi,
sunt in istis inferioribus velut quaedam qualitates
particulares et formae; sed in corporibus caelestibus
sunt velut quaedam universales virtutes, a quibus
derivantur in haec inferiora. Similiter etiam et
quaecumque sunt in natura corporali, sunt eminentius
in natura intellectuali; fornme enim rerum corporalium
in ipsis rebus corporalibus sunt materialiter at
particulariter; in ipsis vero substantiis intellectualibus sunt immaterialiter et universaliter; • • • ex
divina sapientia profluxerunt formae rerum in substantiae intellectuales, quibus res intelligerent.
De Anima, q.un.a.l8.c.
Now whatever a lower power can do a higher power can do.

Since the soul

united to the body is able to know material things it must be admitted that
the separated soul will likewise be able to have such kncw;ledge, for its
mode of existence is higher when separated.

Likewise separate substances

which are superior to the soul can know material things.
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• • • quidquid potest inferior virtus potest virtus
superior. Sed intellectus hominis, qui est ordine
naturae infra intellectum Angeli, potest cognoscere
res materiales. Ergo multo fortius intellectus ·
Angeli.
~.Theol., I.q.57.a.l.
The knowledge which the angels have of material things is not drawn from the
material things themselves, but rather, from actually intelligible species
of things which are connatural to separate substances •
• • •Angelus • • • non autem accipit cognitionem earum
a rebus materialibus, sed per species actu intelligibiles rerum sibi connaturales rerum materialium notitiam habet, sicut intellectus noster secundum species
quas intelligibiles facit abstrahendo.
~.Theol., I.q.57.a.l.ad 3um.
The possible intellect of the separated soul is in potentiality to all
things intelligible, and is made actual through the influence of separate
substances which are in act in respect to all intelligible things.

There-

fore the separated soul can understand all natural things.
Again, whatever understands that which is more intelligible understands
that also which is less so.

Since the separated soul understands itself

and separate substances which are more intelligible than material things it
ust also be able to understand material things •
• • • quicumque intelligit majora intelligibilia, intelligit etiam minora. • .Si igitur anima separata intelligit substantias separatas quae sunt maxima intelligibilia • • • videtur sequi quod intelligat omnia alia
intelligibilia. • •
• • .quidquid est in inferiori natura, totum est in
superiori. Sed anima separata est superior rebus
naturalibus. Ergo omnia naturalia sunt quodammodo in
anima. Sed anima oognoscit seipsam. Ergo cognoscit
omnia naturalia.
De Anima, q.un.a.l8.c.
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Although the separated soul can know all natural things yet it does not
follow from this that the soul knows all singulars.

Angels know singulars

both as to their universal and their individuating principles, since it
knOWs them by universal forms, a kind of participated similitude of the
Divine Essence which is the cause of universal and individuating principles.
Sicut enim a Deo profluxerunt res, ut in propria natura
subsisterent; ita ex divina sapientia profluxerunt
formae rerum in substantias intellectuales, quibus res
intelligerent.
Now the angelic intellect has perfect knowledge through such species,
knowing not only the specific natures but also singulars contained in the
species.

However the separated soul, although like the separate substances

in its mode of operation, is unlike them in its intellective power.

Con-

sequently the soul knows the specific natures of things confusedly, and it
kn~rs

only those singulars to which it has some determinate relation.

It

will know some singulars therefore and not others •
• • • animae separatae non solum cognoscunt species,
sed individua; non taman omnia, sed aliqua; et ideo
non oportet quod sint in ea. species infinitae.
~Anima, q.un.a.l8.a.d 7um.
Since to know a thing in the universal only is imperfect and incomplete
knowledge the soul is not perfectly reduced to act, but is in potentiality
to knowledge of some things.
• • .quod anima separata habens universalem cognitionem
scibilium naturalium, non est perfecta reducta in actum;
quia cognoscere aliquid in universali, est cognoscere
imperfects et in potentia • • •
De Anima, q.un.a..l8.a.d 14um.
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The reason for this is that the separated soul, being inferior to the
separate substances, cannot perfectly know them, and consequently does not
clearly see all those things known by these superior intellects.
• • .quod anima separata non perfecte comprehendit
substantiam separatam; et ideo non oportet quod
cognoscat omnia quae in ipsa sunt per similitudinem.
De Anima, q.un.a.l8. ad lum.
Now even while united to the body the intellectual soul has knowledge of
singulars, indirectly it is true, and by reflection.

Thus, it considers its

act and the intelligible species which is the principle of its operation,
and finally comes to the consideration of the material representation of
the object and knowledge of singulars, and first of all of those of which
it received knowledge while united to the body •
• • • formare propositiones non est nisi intellectus.
Sed anima etiam conjuncta corpori, format propositionem cujus subjectum est singulare, praedicatum
universals; ut cum dico: Socrates est homo; quod non
possum facere nisi cognoscerem singulare, et comparationem ejus ad universale. Ergo etirum anin~
separata per intellectum cognoscit singuls.ria • • •
• • .quidquid pot est virtus inferior, pot est superior.
Sed sensus potest cognoscere singularia, qui est
inferior intellectu. Ergo et anima separate. secundum
intellectum potest singularia cognoscere.
De Anima, q.un.e..20.c.
It cannot however know singulars in the same mode as when united to the
body.
• •• anima conjuncta corpori per intellectum cognoscit
singulare, non quidem directe, sed per quandam reflexionem; in quanturr. scilicet ex hoc quod apprehendit suum
intelligibile, revertitur ad considerandum suum actum,
et speciem intelligibilem quae est principium suae
operationis; et ejus speciei originem; et sic venit in
considerationem phantasmatum, et singule.rium, quorum
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sunt phantasmata. Sed haec reflaxio co.mpleri non potest
nisi per adjunctionem virtutis cognitativae at imaginativae, quae non sunt in anima separata; unde per modum
istum anima separata singularia non cognoscit.
~Anima, q.un.a.20.c.
Superior separate substances are able to have knowledge of singulars
because their intellectual power is proportionate to the universality of
forms existing in them, end consequently they know the species of all
natural things existing in a genus and all singulars contained in the
species.

But the power of the separated soul is proportionate to those

forms abstracted from rna. teris.l

thin~;s.

Thus the soul will not be able to

know all natural things completely and distinctly, but it wi 11 be able to
know those singulars to >mich it has been determined by previous knowledge,
or by some special affection or aptitude •
• • • anima separata non cognoscit omnia naturalia,
etiam secundum species, determinate et complete, sed
in quadam universalitate et confusione; unde nee
species influxae sufficiunt in eis ad cognitionem
singularium, quorum singularium; ad quae anima habet
aliquem ordinem specialem vel inclinationem, sicut ad
ea quae patitur, vel ad ea ad quae afficitur, vel
quorUE. aliquae impressiones et vestigia in ea remanent.
Onlil.e enim receptum determinatur in recipiente secundum
modum recipientis. Et sic patet quod anima separata
cognoscit singularia; non tmnen omnia, sed quaedam.
De Anima, q.un.a.20.c.
In answering the objection that because the soul while united to the
body can know singulars only through the senses and not directly, the
separated soul will be unable to know singulars at all, St. Thomas points
out that the separated soul will be, in a way, like superior separate substances and able to receive from them influx of intelligible species,
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through Which it will knovr singulars.

The soul united to the body will not

be free to receive such species, not because its nature is different when
separated, but because it is in a sense, cut off by the body from receiving
such influence.
• • .anima separate. sit ejusdem naturae cum anima conjuncta corpori: tamen propter separationem a corpore
habet aspectum liberum ad substantias superiores, ut
possit per eas recipere influxum intelligibilium
formarum, per quas singularia cognoscat; quod non
potest dum est corpori unite., ut in superioribus
ostensum est.
.E;: Anima, q.un.a.20. ad l5um.
Thus both the separated soul and the soul united to the body will be able
to know singulars, but according to different modes.

The separated soul,

having a mode of existence superior in itself, will know singulars according
to a superior mode, though one less perfect for the soul.
It is objected that the act of knowledge acquired here cannot remain
in the separated soul because to consider what was previously known is an

act of the memory and memory is destroyed together vnth the corruption of
the body.
Videtur quod actus scientiae hie acquisitae non maneat
in anima separate. • • • corrupto corpore, anima neque
reminiscitur, neque amat. Sed cons~derare ea. quae
prius novit, est reminisci. Ergo anima separate. non
potest habere actum scientiae qurum hie acquisivit.
~.Theol., I.q.89.e.• 6.
It must be remembered that the memory which will be destroyed at the death
of the body belongs to the sensitive part of man, but memory considered as
the power of retaining species exists, not in any corporeal organ, but in
the intellectual part for,
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• • • ratione memoriae sit conservare species rerum quae
actu non apprehenduntur, hoc primum considerari oportet,
utrum species intelligibiles sic in intellectu conservari
possint.
Sum.Theol., I.q.79.a.6.c.
Those things which were previously understood are preserved in the intellect
and are not destroyed by the death of the body.

St. Thomas meets the fur-

ther objection that in this present life the soul cannot understand by

in~

telligible species without turning to the phantasm, and since the intelligible species cannot have greater power in the separated soul than in the
soul united to the body, when there are no phantasms to which it can turn,
understanding through species here acquired is impossible.
• • .incorporalium non sunt aliqua phantasmata; quia
imaginatio tempus et continuum non transcendit. Si
ergo intellectus noster non posset aliquid intelligere
in actu, nisi converteretur ad phantasmata, sequeretur
quod non posset intelligere incorporeum aliquid. • •
~.Theel., I.q.84.a.7.ob.
In replying to this objection st. Thomas points out that in any action two
things must be considered, first, the species, which is determined by the
object and secondly, the mode, which is determined by the power of the
agent.

Thus, that an object is seen by the eye is due to the species of

the object in the eye, but that it is seen clearly is due to the perfection
of the visual power.

Now the intelligible species remain in the separated

soul as was said, consequently the soul

~~11

know what it formerly knaw.

But as the mode of existence of the separated soul is different its mode of
operation will likewise be different, and consequently it will not need the
phantasm.
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• • .impossibile est intellectum nostrum secundum praesentis vitae statum quo passibili corpori conjungitur
aliquid in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata • • •
~.Theol., I.q.84.a.7.c •
• • • in actu est duo considerare: Scilicet speciem actus,
et modum ipsius. Et species quidem actus consideratur
ex objectio, in quod actus cognoscitivae virtutis dirigitur per speciem, quae est objecti similitude; sed modus
actus pensatur ex virtute agentis; sicut quod aliquis
videat lapidem, contingit ex specie lapidis, quae est in
oculo; sed quod acute videat, contingit ex virtute visiva
oculi. Cum igitur species intelligibiles maneant in
anima separata • • • status autem animae separatae non sit
idem sicut modo est; sequitur quod secundum species intelligibiles hie acquisitas anima separata intelligere
possit quae prius intellexit; non tamen eadem modo,
scilicet per conversionem ad phantasroata, sed per modum
convenientem aniroae separatae. Et ita manet quidem in
anima separata actus scientiae hie acquisitae, sed non
secundum eumdem modum.
~.Theel., I.q.89.a.6.
It is further objected that since habits produce acts similar to those
whereby they are acquired and the acts whereby the habit of knowledge is
here acquired are not adapted to the separated soul, no act of
here acquired can be produced by the separated soul.

kn~vledge

It is true that in

the present life the intellect acquires the habit of knowledge by turning
to the phantasms, which it cannot do when in a separate state of existence.
But since habits produce acts similar in species. but not necessarily similar
in mode to those acts whereby the habits are acquired, the objection does
not hold.
• •• actus per quos acquiritur habitus, sunt similes
actibus quos habitus causant, quantum ad specie.m actus,
non autem quantum ad modum agendi. Nam operari justa,
sed non justa, id est delectabiliter, causat habitum
justitiae politicae, per quem deleotabiliter operamur.
~.Theol., I.q.89.a.6.e.d 3um.
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Since the separated soul understands in a mode suited to it as existing
apart from the body, things which were impediments to its understanding
while united to the body will no longer be so.

Thus while the soul was in

the body in order for it to carry on its proper operation the sense and the
sensible object had in some way to come into contact.
be impeded by local distance.

This contact might

An object afar off, for example, would not

be seen clearly and consequently could not be known distinctly.

Now the

sensible faculties by which the phantasnw are produced do not remain in
the separated soul.

Since local distance is an impediment only in so far as

the senses are concerned it follows that the impediment no longer exists
when the soul no longer requires the senses.
• • .anima separata cognosceret singularia abstrahendo
a sensibilibus. Quod si asset verum, posset dici quod
distantia localis impediret animae separatae cognitionem.
Requireretur enim quod vel sensibilia agerent in animam
separatam, vel anima separata in sensibilia; et quantum
ad utrumque requireretur distantia determinata. Sed
praedicta positio est impossibilis; quia abstratio
specierum a sensibilibus fit mediantibus sensibus, at
aliis potentiis sensitivis, quae in anima separata actu
non manent. Intelligit autent anima separata singularia
per influxum specierum ex divino lumina; quod quidem
lumen aequaliter sa habet ad propinquum et distans.
~nde distantia localis nullo modo impedit animae
separatae cognitionem.
Sum.Theol., I.q.89.a.7.c.
And:

• • • manifestum est in eisdem quod looalis distantia
cognitionem animae separatae impedire non potest.
Localis enim distantia per se comparatur ad sensum,
non autem ad intellectum, nisi per accidens, inquantum
a sensu accipit: nam sensibilia secundum determinatrum
distantiam movent sensum; intelligibilia autem acti,
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secundum quod movent intellectum, non sunt in loco, cum
sint a materia corporali separata. Cum igitur substantiae
separatae non accipiant intellectivam cognitionem a
sensibilibus, in eorum cognitionem distantia localis
nihil operatur.
II Cont.Gent., 96.
Did these sensitive powers remain the soul, as some have said, local distanc
would be an impediment.
Dicunt etiam, quod sunt duplices potentiae sensitivae;
quadedam quae sunt in ipsa anima principium interiorum
actuum; et instaemanent in anima separata, corpore
destructio cum suis actibus; quaedam vero sunt principia
exteriorum actuum, quae sunt in an~A simul at corpore,
at pereunte corpore, pereunt. Sed haec positio stare
non potest.
De Anima, q.un.a.l9.c.
Thus the soul will understand without the aid of the senses and like separat
substances will be indifferent to what is near or far.
• • .quod intellectus indiget auxilio sensus secundum
statum imperfectae cognitionis, prout scilicet accipit
a phantasmatibus; non autem secundum perfectionem cognitionis modum, qui competit animae separatae; sicut
homo indiget lacte in pueritia, nam t~£n in perfecta
aetate.
~Anima, q.un.a.l9.ad 19.
Because local distance does not impede the knowledge of the separated soul
it does not follow that distance of time does not impede it.
tance of time does impede this
things naturally.

kn~<ledge,

Rather dis-

for the soul cannot know future

One cannot argue from distance of space to distance of

time for what is locally distant actually exists, but what is distant in
time does not actually exist and consequently is unknowable •
• • • quod distantia secundum locum sunt in rerum natura.
et participant aliquam speciem, cujus similitude est in
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Angelo; quod non est verum de futuris, • • • et ideo non
est simile.
~.Theol., I.q.57.a.3.ad 4um.
The future can be known in two ways, first, in its cause, as one can know
that an oak tree will come from an acorn, or that an eclipse will take
place in the future •
• • • dupliciter possunt futura cognosci: uno modo in
seipsis, alia modo in suis causis. In seipsis quidem
a nullo cognosci possunt nisi a Deo: cujus ratio est,
quia futura, prout futura sunt., nondum habent esse in
seipsis; esse autem et verum convertuntur; unde cum
omnis cognitio respiciens futura in ratione futuri,
cognoscat ea in seipsis.
and,
• • .unumquodque hoc modo cognoscitur in aliquo quo
est in eo. Quaedam igitur futura in causis suis
proxirr~s determinata sunt hoc modo, ut ex eis necessaria contingant, sicut Solem oriti eras; et tales
effectus futuri in suis causis cognosci possunt.
E!:, ~·· q.8.a.l2.
In this way the soul, whether present in the body or separate from it, is
able to know the future.

Secondly, the future can be known in itself, and

in this manner even casual and chance events can be known •
• • • apparet quod Deus non entium notitirum habet; non
tamen omnia non entia eamdem habent habitudinem ad
eius scientirum: ea enim quae non sunt, ~ec erunt, nee
fuerunt, a Deo sciuntur quasi eius virtuti possibilia.
~nde non cognoscit ea ut existentia aliqualiter in se
ipsis, sed existentia solum in divina potentia; quae
quidem a quibusdam dicuntur a Deo cognosci secundum
notitiam simplicis intelligentiae. Ea vero quae sunt
praesentia, praeterita, vel futura nobis cognoscit
Deus secundum quod sunt in potentia sua, et in
propriis causis, et in se ipsis: et horum cognitio
dicitur notitia visionis. Non enim Deus rerum quae
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apud nos nondum sunt, videt solum esse quod habent in
suis causis, sed etiam illud quod habent in se ipsis,
inquantum eius aeternitas est praesent sua indivisibilitate omni tempori; et twmen esse uniuscumque rei
Deus cognoscit per essentiam suam: nam sua essentia
est repraesentabilis secundum multa quae non .sunt, nee
erunt, nee fuerunt: ipsa etiam est similitude virtutis
cuiuslibet causae, secundum quam praeexistunt effectus
in causis: esse etiam cujuslibet rei quod habet in se
ipsa, est ab ea exemplariter deductum. Sic igitur non
entia cognoscit Deus, inquantum aliquo modo habeat esse
vel in potentia Dei, vel in causis suis, vel in se
ipsis; quod rationi scientiae non obsistit •••
I ~.Gent., 66.
And:
• • • Deus futura contingentia sciat • • •
I Cont.Gent.87.
This knowledge of future things belongs to God alone however, and is not
naturally possible to any created intellect.

The intellectual soul, like

all created intellects, can understand only by species.

Now things not yet

existing have no nature whereby they can be likened to species existing in
the mind of separate substances and known.

Therefore Angelic intellects

cannot know the future in itself, much less can the separated soul •
• • • species quae sunt in intellectu Angeli, quantum
est de se, aequaliter se habeant ad praesentia, praeterita, et futura; tamen praesentia, praeterita, et
futura non aequaliter se habent ad species •• • ; quia
ea quae praesentia sunt, habent naturam per quam
assirr~lantur speciebus quae sunt in mente Angeli; et
sic per eas cognosci possunt. Sed quae futura sunt,
nondum habent naturam per quam illis assimilentur.
~nde per eas cognosci non possunt.
~.Theol., I.q.57.a.3. ad 3um •
• • • species quae sunt in mente Angeli, non se habent
aequaliter ad praesentia, et futura: quia illa quae
sunt praesentia, sunt similia inactu formis in Angelis
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existentibus, et sic per ea possunt cognosci; illa
vero quae sunt futura, nondum sunt similia; et ideo
per formas praedictas non cognosountur • • •
~ Ver., q.8.a.l2. ad lum.
Since local distance does not impede the knowledge of the separated
soul, as was said, it might seem that these souls know what takes place on
earth.
Videtur quod animae separatae cognoscant ea quae hie
aguntur.
Sum.T~eol., I.89.a.s.c.
This does not follow however, for it is not local distance which prevents
the separated soul from having knowledge of what takes place here, but
rather the soul's mode of existence Dnpedes such knowledge.

The soul has

knowledge of those singulars to which it is in some way determined, either
by knowledge acquired in union with the body or by Divine ordinance.

The

soul existing apart from the body has existence as a separate substance and
is not determined to corporeal things, things, that is, of this world.
Therefore it cannot naturally have direct knowledge of what happens here •
• • • animae separatae non impediuntur a oognoscendis
quae sunt hie, propter loci distantiam; sed quia non
est in eis tanta efficacia intellectivae virtutis,
ut per species influxas omnia singularia cognoscere
possint.
~Anima. 1 q.un.a.20. ad 3um.
This is because a thing is received according to the disposition of the
thing receiving it, and the separated soul is in no way naturally disposed
to receive directly knowledge of this world •
• • • animae vero separatae non possunt cognoscere per
hujusmodi species nisi solum singularia illa ad quae
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quodam modo determinantur vel per naturalem habitudinem,
vel per divinam ordinationem; quia omne quod recipitur
in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis.
~.Theol., I.q.89.a.4.c.
Animae autem mortuorum secundum ordinationem divinam
et secundum modum essendi segregatae sunt a conversatione viventium, et conjunctae conversationi spiritualium substantiarum quae sunt a corpore separatae;
unde ea quae apud nos aguntur, ignorant.
~-Theol., I.q.89.a.s.c.
But just as the soul can know singulars indirectly so too can it receive
indirect knowledge of what happens in this world.

Being a separated soul

it can know and consequently receive knowledge from other separated souls.
Thus the soul can have some knowledge of the affairs of this world.
Possunt etiam facta viventium non per seipsos cognoscere,
sed vel per animas eorum qui hinc ad eos accedunt, vel
per Angelos seu daemones, vel etiam Spiritu Dei revelante • • •
~.Theel., I.q.89.a.s. ad lum.
The objection has been raised that the separated soul cannot know
separate substances.

Since the soul joined to the body is more perfect

than the separated soul and yet is unable to understand separate substances,
it would seem that the separated soul would be still more incapable of such
knowledge •
• • • anima unita corpori est perfectior quam separata,
ut videtur; quia quaelibet pars perfectior est unita
toti quam separata. Si igitur anima unita corpori
non potest intelligere substantiae separatas, videtur
quod nee a corpore separata.
De Anima, q.un.a.l7.c.
Although it is true that the soul united to the body is more perfect according to its nature than separated, yet the separated soul is more perfect as
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regards its intellectual operation.

Consequently the separated soul will be

more capable of understanding separate substances than is the soul united
to the body.

1.:oreover, independence of matter makes a thing to be a proper

term of intellect, and the separated soul, free from the weight of the body,
has nothing to impede its knowledge, consequently it will be able to understend other separated souls and even superior separate substances.
Si autem substantiae separatae intelligunt ea quae
sunt per se intelligibilia, ut est ostensum • • • per
se autem intelligibilia sunt substantiae separatae,
immunitas enim a materia facit aliquid esse per se
intelligibile, • • • sequitur quod substantiae separatae intelligant sicut propria objecta substantas
separatas. Unaquaeque igitur et se ipsam, et
alias cognoscet.
II Cont .Gent., 98.
Moreover, even while united to the body the soul understands itself', though
indirectly,
• • • anima nostra se ipsam cognoscit • • •
~

::!.::::·,

q.a.a.6.c.

Since the soul united to the body understands only through the phantasm it
is unable .to understand itself directly, as there can be no phantasm of the
soul.

The separated soul, reduced to act through the influence of separate

substances, will understand itself through itself, and will know those
things having the same nature and mode of existence as itself.
• • .anima humana alio modo cognoscet seipsam cum
fuerit separata; et alio modo nunc • • •
.£:!.Anima, q.un.e..l7. ad 9um.
Further, like is known by like, thus, separated souls, having the same
nature and mode of existence vdll be able to know one another.
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• • .simile a simili cognoscitur. Sed anima separata
est substantia separata. Ergo potest intelligere
substantias separatas.
De Anima, q.un.a.l7.c.
Again, likeness is the cause of knowledge,
• • • similitude est causa cognitionis.
De "'!:.!._•, q.s.a.7.c.
Since the separated soul can understand material things much more is it
able to understand separated souls, for it is of the same nature as they.
Every separate substance understands what is above itself and what is
below itself, according to its mode of existence.
• • .animae separatae cognoscunt alias animas separatas • • • Est autem commune omni substantiae separatae
quod intelligat id quod est supra se, et id quod est
infra se, per modum suae substantiae.
~.Theol., I.q.89.a.2.c.
Consequently after the death of the body, the soul, being itself a separate
substance, will be able to understand in a measure superior separate substances.

Although the separated soul understands itself through itself, it

vnll not be able to understand separate substances through itself, but
rather, through impressed species.

1/.oreover the angels are superior to the

human intellect and therefore will not be perfectly understood so far as
the natural knowledge of the soul is concerned.
The angels know themselves and other angels through impressed species
existing in the angelic intellect.

Since the intellectual power of the

angels is proportionate to these species, the knowledge thus acquired is
perfect.
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I

• • .unicuique Angelo impressa est ratio suae spec1e1
secundum esse naturale et intellectuale simul, ita
scilicet quod in natura suae speciei subsisteret, et
per eam se intelligeret; aliarum vero naturarum, tam
spiritualium quam corporalium, rationes sunt ei impressae secundum esse intellectuale tantum, ut videlicet per hujusmodi species impressas tam creaturas
corporales quam spirituales cognosceret.
~.Theol., I.q.56.a.2.c.
The intellectual soul, being inferior to the angels, has imperfect knowledge
of them according to this mode however •
• • • anima separata intuendo directe essentiam suam,
cognoscet substantias separatas secundum influentiam
receptam ab eis, vel a superiori causa, scilicet Deo;
nam tarr~n ita perfecta cognoscet substantias separatas
naturali cognitione, sicut ipsae cognoscunt se invicem • • •
De Anima, q.un.a.l7.c.
Just as the soul is unable to know itself through its essence, so too is it
ble to know separate substances through its essence.

Rather, the soul

ows what is above it through impressed species.
The separated soul can know not only itself and other separated souls,
superior separate substances by natural knowledge, but it can also know

• • • homines per sua naturalia Deum cognoscere possunt • • •
~.Theel., I.q.56.a.3.c.
However, as the soul is incapable of perfect knowledge of separate substances it is even more impotent

~~th

regard to knowledge of God.

Virtus autem divinae essentiae, qua est intelligibilis,
excedit intellectum angelicum, et omnem intellectum
creatum, secundum hoc quod est cognoscitivus: veritas
enim divinae essentiae, qua cog;noscibilis est, excedit
lumen cuiuslibet intellectus creati, quo cognoscitivus
est. Et ideo impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus
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creatus divinrum essentiam comprehendat, non quia partem
aliquam eius ignoret, sed quia ad perfectum modum cognitionis ipsius pertingere non potest.
De :!!!!:_•, q.8.a.2.c.
As matter without form is wholly unknowable so, inversely, infinity of form
not limited by matter is supremely knowable •
• • • infinitum quod se tenet ex parte materiae non perfectae per formrum, ignotum est secundum se, quia omnis
cogniUo est per formam; sed infinitum quod se tenet ex
parte formae non limitatae per materiam, est secundum
se maxime notum. Sic autem Deus est infinitus • • •
Sum.Theol., I.q.l2.a.r.e.d 2um.
But the human intellect is proportionate to the lowest intelligible forms,
natures of material things, and is incapable of attaining naturally to an
adequate lcnowledge of God,

~no

exceeds every kind of knowledge •

• • • Deus • • • est supra omne existens in quantum est
suum esse. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod nullo modo
possit cognosci; sed quod omnem cognitionem excedat;
quod est ipsum non comprehendi.
Ibid., ad 3um.
Cognitum autem est in cognoscente secundum modum
cognoscentis. Unde cujuslibet cognoscentis cognitio est secundum modum suae naturae. Si igitur
modus essendi alicujus rei cognitae excedat modum
naturae cognoscentis, oportet quod cognitio illius
rei sit supra naturam illius cognoscentis.
Sum.Theol., I.q.l2.a.4.c.
Therefore unless the soul have the light of Glory it cannot see the Essence
of God.
• •• Non igitur potest intellectus creatus Deum per
essentiam videre, nisi in quantum Deus per suam
gratiam se intellectui creato conjungit ut intelligibilem ab ipso.
Ibid.
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• • .quamvis intellectus noster sit ractus ad hoc quod
videat Deum, non tamen ut naturali sua virtute Deum
videre possit, sed per lumen gloriae sibi inrusum.
Et ideo omni velamina remota nondum oportet quod intellectus Deum per essentiam videat, si lumen gloriae
non illustretur: ipsa enim carentia gloriae erit
divinae visionis impedimentum.
~ Ver., q.lO.a.ll. ad 7um.
The separated soul no longer understands by turning to the phantasm so
the question arises, does the acting intellect by which the intelligible
species are abstracted remain in the soul?

If so, what is its function?

St. Thomas answers that the acting intellect does remain in the soul
because it is natural and what is natural remains •
• • • eaedam potentiae intellectivae quae nunc sunt in
anima, erunt in separe.ta, quia naturales: naturalia
autem oportet manere, quamvis nunc habeant ordinam ad
corpus, quem tunc non habebunt • • •
~ Ver. 1 q.l9.a.• I.ad Sum.
:fuatever operations of the soul are performed without a corporeal organ are
in the soul as both their principle and subject.

The acting intellect is

not subjected in the compositum, but rather belongs to the soul alone as its
subject.

It must, then, remain in the separated soul •
• • • in anima separata renWillebit potentia intellectiva,
et intellectus agens, et possibilis: • • •
~·~ ad 6um.

And:

• • • omnes potentiae aniu~e comparantur ad animam solam
sicut ad principium. Sed quaedam potentiae comparantur
ad animam solam sicut ad subjectum, ut intellectus et
voluntas; et huiusmodi potentiae necesse est quod maneant
in anima, corpore destructo.
~-Theol., I.q.77.a.8.c.
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There must be in man's nature an active and a potential intellect, neither
of which can be separated from the soul of man.
• • .in natura cuiuslibet moventis est principium sufficiens ad operationem eiusdem: et si quidem operatic
illa consistat in actione, adest ei principium activum
• • • si vero operatic illa consistat in passione, adest
ei principium passivum • • • Homo autem est perfectissimus
inter omnia inferiora moventia: eius autem propria, et
naturalis operatic est intelligere, quae non completur
sine passione quadrun, inquantum quilibet intellectus
patitur ab intelligibili; nee etiam sine actione, inquantum intelleotus faoit intelligibilia in potentia,
esse intelligibilia in actu. Oportet igitur in
natura hominis esse utriusque proprium principium,
scilicet intellectum agentem, et possibilem, et
neutrum secundum esse ab anin~ hominis separatum esse.
II ~·~·• 76.

Now the function of the acting intellect which is most stressed is its
making the potentially intelligible to be actually intelligible.
further function of the acting intellect is suggested.

However a

Supposing the phan-

tasms to be made actually intelligible by a separate acting intellect it
would still be necessary that the human soul have some active power drawn
from that Separate Intellect by which the soul could make things intelligibl
actually.
Posuerunt ergo quidam hunc intellectum sectmdum substantiam separatum esse intellectum agentem, qui
quasi illustrando phantasmata facit ea intelligibilia
actu.
Sed dato quod sit aliquis talis intellectus agens
separatus, nihilominus taman oportet ponere in ipsa
anima humana aliquam virtutem ab illo intellectus
superiori participatam, per quan1 anima facit intelligibilia in actu. • •
~.Theol., I.q.79.a.4.c.
Now what is actually intelligible does not need to be made more intelligible.
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Were this power of the acting intellect merely to render actually intelligible what was already intelligible it would seem superfluous.

Yet the acting

intellect is natural to man and nature does nothing in vain.
st. Thomas points out that two things are necessary for intellectual
vision, power of sight and union of the thing seen with the faculty of
vision, vision being made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain
way in the seer.
• • .ad visionem tam sensibilem, quam intelleotualem,
duo requireuntur, scilicet virtus visiva, et unio rei
visae cum visu. Non enim fit visio in actu, nisi per
hoc quod res visa quodammodo est invidente.
~.Theol., I.q.l2.a.2.c.
In another place st. Thomas maintains that through the possible intellect
the separated soul will receive species from superior separate substances
and through the acting intellect it will have power of understanding.
Operatic intellectus agentis et possibilis respicit
phantasmata secundum quod est anima corpori unita.
Sed cum erit anima a corpore separata, per intellectum possibilem respiciet species effluentes a
substantiis superioribus, et per intellectum agentem
habebit virtutem ad intelligendum.
De Anima, q.un.a.l5.c.
Now the possible intellect is that whereby the soul understands,
• • • intellectus possibilis est quo intelligit anima.
]2! Anima, q.un.a.3.c.
yet the potential intellect must be made actual and nothing potential can
render itself actual, but must be made actual by what is in act.

Then this

power by ;W1ich the soul can become actually knowing must be something in the
soul itself, and not the work of an outside agent.

This is because no agent
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works except by some power which is formally in the agent as a constituent
of its being.
Nihil operatur nisi per aliquam virtutem, quae formaliter
in ipso est. • •
II ~.Gent., 76.
The impression of the intelligible species upon the potential intellect must
in some way be brought about by the action of a power in the soul, for St.
Thomas points out that the intellectual operation cannot be effected in us
through the mere impression of some superior beings •
• • • non tamen ita quod intellectualis operatic causetur
in nobis ex sola impressions aliquarum rerum superiorem • • •
s~~.Theol., I.q.84.a.6.c.
St. Thomas likens the acting intellect to a kind of light and he says that
through the acting intellect the soul will have the power of understanding,
as was said.
Unde et virtus intellectualis creaturae lumen quodam
intelligibile dicitur, quasi a prima luce derivatum,
siva hoc intelligatur de virtute naturali, siva de
aliqua perfections superaddita gratiae, vel gloriae.
Sum.Theol., I.q.l2.a.2.c.
It would seem that the acting intellect has a function beyond abstracting
the intelligible species from the phantasm, and making them to be actually
intelligible.

:!\Caking them actually intelligible might be taken in two

senses, first in regard to the phantasm, making it to be intelligible in
act:
• • .intellectum agentem facit phe.ntasmata a sensibus
accepta intelligibilia in actu per modum abstractionis
cujusdam.
Sum.Theol., I.q.84.a.6.c.
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Secondly, in regard to the potential intellect, by effecting the union of
the intelligible species with the possible intellect, so that the possible
intellect can actually understand.

This might account for both the ex-

pression:
• • • per intellectum agentem habebit virtutem ad intelligendum • • •
~ Anima, q.un.a.l5.c.
and:

• • .sed forte ad praebendum lumen intelligibile intelligenti. • •
Sum.Theol., I.q.79.a.3.c.
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